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Today Europe finds itself on the frontline in the fight against terrorism 
and jihadist radicalisation. Over the past fourteen months, the 
horrendous terrorist attacks that have taken place in France, Germany 
and Belgium, as well as in Turkey, Tunisia, and elsewhere around the 
world, have claimed hundreds of lives. As a Belgian national, the three 
bombs that were detonated in my country, in the departure hall of 
the Brussels International Airport in Zaventem, and at the Maelbeek 
Metro station, a few hundred metres from key EU institutions, was a 
particularly traumatic moment for me. In many ways, the attacks of 
22 March were Belgium’s own 9/11, representing the worst terrorist 
attacks committed on Belgian territory in the country’s modern 
history. The attacks demonstrate a clear shift in the resolve and ability 
of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations, 
and are devised to induce a high state of well-publicised terror.
The attacks have highlighted the growing phenomenon of jihadist 
radicalisation in many EU Member States, and far beyond. As with 
the Paris, Rouen, Nice and Berlin attacks, the Brussels bombings were 
carried out in the name of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq 
(ISIS/Daesh), by young people who had been radicalised with several 
of those involved having travelled to Syria to fight for ISIS/Daesh. 
While some of the attacks were carried out by ‘lone wolves’, others 
were well-coordinated, complex attacks by groups of militants. 
The carefully planned attacks have emphasised the elevated threat 
to Europe from a fanatic minority. A network of people born and 
raised in Europe, often radicalised within a relatively short period 
of time, have proven to be willing and able to act as facilitators and 
active accomplices in terrorism. The attacks exposed the failure 
of counter-terrorism policies across the continent which had left 
Europe particularly vulnerable. The danger emanating from jihadist 
radicalisation has now become one of the most serious threats to 
European security, and to the values that the European Union was 
built on, remaining on an upward trajectory.
The problem of tackling jihadist radicalisation has become a Europe-
wide issue. It requires intensified cooperation and intelligence-sharing 
across Member States through enhanced cross-border cooperation 
between relevant counter-terrorist authorities, as well as with key 
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third countries and regions including Turkey, the Western Balkans, 
Northern Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf. Analysing objectively the 
work carried out by security and intelligence forces, as well as other 
governmental authorities, nationally and transnationally, in order to 
properly determine where weak spots are, along with re-evaluating 
integration and assimilation policies in Europe which have, to a large 
extent, failed is also of crucial importance. Member States need to 
invest in education, housing, job opportunities and the like to foster 
the integration of Muslim communities living in urban banlieues. There 
is also an urgent need to empower civil society groups and role models 
in Muslim communities and increase their resilience vis-à-vis the threat 
of jihadist radicalisation and the ensuing self-alienation from, and 
potentially violent antagonism against, European societies and values.
Furthermore, it will also require greater cooperation and input from 
the expert community and think tanks working on the issue, including 
the one of which I am President, the European Policy Centre (EPC). In 
the aftermath of the Paris attacks, the EPC, in partnership with the 
European Foundation for Democracy (EFD), and in cooperation with 
the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), developed a research and event 
project entitled ‘The Challenge of Jihadist Radicalisation for the EU 
and Beyond’ which resulted in this multi-authored book. The book, which 
contains contributions from a number of well-established experts, 
follows a series multi-stakeholder events that took place throughout 
2016, focusing on the various dimensions of jihadist radicalisation, 
including the phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation, radicalisation in 
schools, mosques and universities, radicalisation and social media, 
the geopolitical aspects in key regions, and national counter-violent 
extremism experiences in some key EU Member States.
This book aims to provide relevant findings and policy recommendations 
for the EU and its Member States in order to address jihadist 
radicalisation. Further EPC-EFD work on this topic will continue 
throughout 2017. I would like to thank all those who have contributed 
to this publication along with my colleagues in the EPC who are 
managing this project, Amanda Paul, Andrea Frontini, Orhan Dede 
and Francesca Fabbri, and their counterparts from EFD, Roberta 
Bonazzi, Alexander Ritzmann, Demir Murat Seyrek, and John Duhig
Futhermore, it will also require greater cooperation and input from  
the expert community and think tanks working on the issue, including 
the one of which I am President, the European Policy Centre (EPC).
When the European Foundation for Democracy (EFD) was established 
in 2005, the overall debate on terrorism and the phenomenon 
of radicalisation was in its early days but already showing signs of 
significantly polarised positions. The goal of EFD was to contribute to 
an informed debate by developing in-house expertise and involving a 
broad range of experts and practitioners with different cultural and 
professional backgrounds. Our efforts have focused on prevention of 
radicalisation and on supporting initiatives to strengthen resilience of 
communities by empowering credible pro-democratic voices.
Today, as the threats of terrorism and radicalisation have become 
more complex and multifaceted, we take pride in our close cooperation 
with the European Policy Centre (EPC) and the Counter Extremism 
Project (CEP) as we continue to share our expertise with the policy 
and other engaged communities.
Our joint programme has spanned one year, with its launch event taking 
place on the day of the Brussels terrorist attacks of 22 March 2016: 
a poignant reminder of the need for all actors to learn from others 
across Europe and beyond its borders. But also a stark confirmation 
that prevention of radicalisation needs to be at the forefront of 
any effective and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. This 
collection of papers reflects the diverse and multi-layered discussion 
in the debates which took place as part of this programme, highlighting 
the many dimensions of radicalisation and how we can address it.
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The role of prevention in protecting our societies from terrorist 
attacks cannot be overstated. The degree to which civil society 
is encouraged and supported by governments and institutions to 
undertake this work with vulnerable communities and individuals will 
be a key factor in ensuring that those on the cusp of being radicalised, 
or already radicalised, are supported in turning away from the path 
of violence and extremism. This is one of the key ways to ensure that 
all our towns and cities become safer. The truism that prevention is 
better than cure has never seemed so apposite.
I would like to thank all colleagues at the European Foundation for 
Democracy, the European Policy Centre and the Counter Extremism 
Project for their commitment, creativity and dedication in ensuring 
the success of this joint programme
The degree to which civil society is encouraged and supported by 
governments and institutions to undertake this work with vulnerable 
communities and individuals will be a key factor in ensuring that those 
on the cusp of being radicalised, or already radicalised, are supported 
in turning away from the path of violence and extremism.
Andrea Frontini, Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre (EPC)  
 
Alexander Ritzmann, Executive Director, European Foundation for Democracy (EFD) 
& Chairman, Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Communications  
and Narratives Working Group
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On 22 March 2016, two coordinated suicide attacks hit the city of 
Brussels. One targeted the departure hall of Zaventem international 
airport, while the other blew up a metro train carriage at the Maelbeek 
station in the heart of the European quarter.
The deadly attacks killed thirty-two civilians and deeply shook 
the daily lives of ordinary citizens, local authorities and the various 
international institutions that populate the capital of Europe. It 
represented yet another episode of a disconcerting wave of terror 
which has plagued Europe for more than two years now.
The deadliest instances have included a shooting at the Jewish Museum 
of Brussels in May 2014, the massacre at the headquarters of the 
Charlie Hebdo magazine and elsewhere in Paris in January 2015, the 
coordinated attacks hitting the Bataclan theatre, the Stade de France, 
a restaurant and a bar, again in Paris during the following November, as 
well as the later attacks by lorries ploughing into crowds of people in Nice 
in July 2016 and in Berlin in December 2016. These were accompanied 
by smaller-scale attacks or attempted attacks in other European 
countries, including France, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom, 
pushing the death toll to over 300 casualties in 21 months.
This series of appalling tragedies came on top of other major terror 
attacks outside the European Union (EU), featuring among others the 
assault on the Bardo Museum in Tunis in March 2015, the bombing of 
a Shia mosque in Kuwait City the following June, the attack on Atatürk 
Airport in Istanbul and the shooting in a night club in Orlando, Florida, 
both in June 2016, along with the attack at the Reina night club in 
Istanbul in the early hours of 1 January 2017. All this has abruptly put 
a long-underrated phenomenon under the spotlight, namely the one 
of (mostly home-grown) jihadist radicalisation across Europe, as well 
as its transnational ramifications within and outside Europe.
A ubiquitous challenge:
EUROPE AND JIHADIST RADICALISATION
All this has abruptly put a long-underrated phenomenon under 
the spotlight, namely the one of (mostly home-grown) jihadist 
radicalisation across Europe, as well as its transnational ramifications 
within and outside Europe.
Although its very notion, exact scope and underlying causes remain 
a subject of relentless debate in the expert community, radicalisation 
can be broadly understood as a “socialisation to extremism”, which 
does or has the potential to “manifest itself in terrorism”.1 Once 
coupled with a violent Islamist ideology, such as (but not only) the 
one provided by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS/Daesh), jihadist radicalisation can be regarded as a distinctive 
phenomenon with specific security, political and broader societal 
characteristics. These, and in particular its international dimension, 
due to the centrality of the ‘Syrian cause’ for the recruitment of 
foreign fighters, make jihadism rather different from other forms 
of violent extremism and terrorism as those provided, for instance, 
by the nationalist/separatist Irish Republic Army (IRA) in Northern 
Ireland, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Countries in 
Spain and France, or by the far-left Brigate Rosse (BR) in Italy and the 
Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in Germany.
As underlined by a significant amount of official and independent 
analyses, radicalisation seems to occur “at the intersection of [complex] 
individual pathways and a societal context”.2 In that framework, a 
multitude of diverse and often interchangeable factors such as political 
or historic resentment, criminal background, kinship and family networks, 
the catalysing role of ideologies and socio-economic marginalisation, 
can all serve as drivers of the jihadist radicalisation process.3 The 
phenomenon can affect vulnerable individuals or groups in various 
real or virtual societal environments, including schools, universities, 
mosques, prisons, peripheral suburbs, and the easily accessible and 
ever-expanding worldwide web, particularly via social media such as 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram, and others.
When it comes to Europe specifically, addressing jihadist radicalisation 
– and the ensuing violent extremism or fully-fledged terrorism it may 
generate – is a high priority for policymakers in the immediate future, 
for at least four distinct but interconnected reasons.
Looking at the foreign policy dimension of the phenomenon, the 
recent rise of ISIS/Daesh and the foreign fighters challenge, but als 
Once coupled with a violent Islamist ideology, such as (but not only) 
the one provided by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS/Daesh), jihadist radicalisation can be regarded as a distinctive 
phenomenon with specific security, political and broader societal 
characteristics.
THE CHALLENGE OF JIHADIST RADICALISATION IN EUROPE AND BEYOND
13
o the past and sadly successful experience of Al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist organisations, clearly demonstrate the blurring of dividing 
lines between internal and external security and, thus, between the 
domestic and international dimensions of counter-terrorism policies. 
As such, effectively tackling radicalisation in Europe also entails a 
better understanding of local drivers in key regions outside Europe, 
such as in North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf, and beyond, and 
more effective cooperation between Europe and the various countries 
concerned. Prevention and countering of radicalisation can thus offer a 
much-needed opportunity for Europe to become a stronger and more 
visible player in an increasingly challenging international environment, 
notably but not solely vis-à-vis its unstable Southern neighbourhood.
From a prominent security viewpoint, after a relatively long break 
since its bloodiest peak during the 1970s, terrorism has come back to 
Europe with a vengeance, posing a renewed, asymmetric and highly 
insidious challenge for European societies and governments alike. The 
radicalisation of vulnerable individuals – in particular foreign fighters 
waging jihad in the broader Middle East – provides a threat of a new 
quality and quantity, which requires a wide range of detection and 
prevention tools. This includes a truly comprehensive and cross-sector 
analytical framework by security establishments across Europe – 
spanning from police forces all the way to intelligence apparatuses.
From a societal perspective, as an issue affecting demographically 
growing but often socio-economically disadvantaged Muslim 
communities across Europe, radicalisation provides a litmus test 
of the persisting risks of existential detachment, cultural alienation 
as well as political and religious polarisation affecting many young 
individuals from the second or third immigrant generation. At the 
same time, by acting as a driver of potential societal insulation within 
Muslim communities, radicalisation can also act as a tangible obstacle 
to the further, crucial integration of those increasingly important and 
active sectors of European societies.
1  See, in particular: Coolsaet, Rik (2016), “All Radicalisation is Local: The Genesis and Drawbacks of an Elusive Concept”, 
Brussels: Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont Paper 84, June 2016, p. 23 available at: http://www.
egmontinstitute.be/publication_article/all-radicalisation-is-local/, last accessed on: 6 January 2017. The definition 
was provided by an Expert Group’s report on radicalisation, submitted to the European Commission in May 2008.
2  Coolsaet, Rik (2016), ibidem, p. 3.
3  See also: Maggioloni, Paolo and Varvelli, Arturo, “Conclusions” in: Varvelli, Arturo (2016) (ed.), “Jihadist Hotbeds. 
Understanding Local Radicalization Processes”, Milan: Edizioni Epoké-ISPI, pp. 153-163, available at: http://www.
ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/jihadist-hotbeds-understanding-local-radicalization-processes-15418, last accessed on: 
6 January 2017.
Nonetheless, while the societal element remains important, research 
indicates that neither poverty nor socio-economic depreciation 
are root causes for terrorism in Europe, especially considering the 
individual biographies of European jihadists, who are mostly better off 
than their peers.4 In addition, the fact that only some specific, socio-
economically marginalised communities produce large numbers of 
radicalised individuals, while others produce few or none5, needs to 
be considered.
Last but not least, the overall political significance of the radicalisation 
phenomenon, and the need to properly address it, have to be fully 
understood within the context of the rise of several populist and 
extremist movements across Europe. These movements are eager 
to exploit the headlines made by terrorism in order to inject a 
narrative of fear, aimed at undermining the credibility of the policy 
recipes by mainstream politics, while often scapegoating Muslim and 
other foreign communities across Europe. This poisoning attitude 
can, in turn, further undermine the already endangered social and 
political fabric in many European countries6 and lead to a ‘circle of 
radicalisation’, where right-wing extremists and radical Islamists feed 
off each other, becoming even more radicalised in the process.
Against the background of the geographically and sectorally ubiquitous 
challenge posed by radicalisation, the member states and institutions 
of the EU have adopted a number of measures since the early 2000s. 
These feature, in particular, the release, under the overarching 
umbrella of the European Agenda on Security from April 2015, of a 
Communication by the European Commission on “Supporting the 
Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism” on 14 
June 2016.7 The Communication aims to further mobilise and better 
connect EU tools and policies to support member states in meeting 
the challenge of radicalisation in seven specific areas, namely: 
supporting research, evidence-building, monitoring and networking; 
countering terrorist propaganda; addressing radicalisation in prisons; 
promoting inclusive education and common EU values; favouring 
an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young 
people; and covering the security and international dimensions 
These movements are eager to exploit the headlines made by 
terrorism in order to inject a narrative of fear, aimed at undermining 
the credibility of the policy recipes by mainstream politics, while often 
scapegoating Muslim and other foreign communities across Europe.
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of the phenomenon. This follows earlier, important steps taken by 
the EU aimed at tackling radicalisation. This included the 2005 EU 
Counter Terrorism Strategy, the establishment of the Radicalisation 
Awareness Network (RAN) in September 2011, and the European 
Commission’s earlier Communication on “Preventing Radicalisation to 
Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s Response” 
of January 2014.8
However, despite the enormous pressure placed on many leaders 
across Europe by public opinion on the urgency of resolving the 
terrorist threat, radicalisation remains a complex and multi-layered 
challenge which demands comprehensive and long-term policies. 
Addressing some of the following, underlying questions remains 
essential: How to effectively define radicalisation? What are the 
ultimate drivers of such a process? How to strengthen the resilience 
of vulnerable individuals and communities? How to effectively counter 
extremist propaganda? How does radicalisation concretely occur in 
key third countries and regions outside Europe, as well as in selected 
hotspots within Europe, such as in prisons, universities, mosques, or on 
the internet? What good practices and lessons can be identified and 
shared to tackle radicalisation in Europe? And how to move forward 
in facing such an insidious and multi-layered challenge?
4  See: Ranstorp, Magnus (2016), “The Root Causes of Violent Extremism”, Brussels: Radicalisation Awareness Network 
(RAN), Issue Paper, January 2016, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf, last 
accessed on: 10 January 2017.
5  Belgians with a Turkish and Sub-Saharan African background are equally or more marginalised in Belgium, yet they 
produce proportionally much fewer extremists or terrorists than some North African communities. See: Van Ostayen, 
Pieter (2016), “Database on Belgium Fighters - Syria and Iraq”, December 2016, available at: https://pietervanostaeyen.
com/, last accessed on: 15 January 2017. In Germany, while three quarters of Muslims are Turks or of Turkish origin, 
only one quarter of extremists are Turkish or of Turkish origin. See: Spiegel Online, “Jeder Vierte Ausgereiste Islamist 
Ist Türkischstämmig”, 17 August 2016, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/islamischer-staat-jeder-
vierte-ausgereiste-islamist-ist-tuerkischstaemmig-a-1108074.html, last accessed on: 20 January 2017.
6  See, among others: Emmanouilidis, Janis A. and Zuleeg, Fabian (2016), “EU@60: Countering a Regressive and Illiberal 
Europe”, Brussels: European Policy Centre, October 2016, pp. 10-11, available at: www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_
id=1&pub_id=7020&year=2016, last accessed on: 6 January 2017.
7  European Commission (2016), “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Supporting the Prevention of 
Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism”, Brussels: European Union, COM(2016) 379 final, 14 June 2016, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-preventing-
radicalisation_en.pdf, last accessed on: 6 January 2017.
8  European Commission (2016), ibidem, p. 2.
In order to address these and other important issues, the European 
Policy Centre (www.epc.eu), the European Foundation for Democracy 
(www.europeandemocracy.eu) and the Counter Extremism Project 
(www.counterextremism.com) launched a joint project on The Challenge 
of Jihadist Radicalisation in Europe and Beyond in early 2016.
The project aimed at promoting a series of multi-stakeholder, public 
debates in Brussels, Belgium, looking at the various dimensions of 
jihadist radicalisation, and the role of the EU, its member states and 
other national and international policy actors in tackling such an 
emerging and alarming phenomenon.
The event series brought together experts and policymakers both 
from Europe and third countries with a diverse, Brussels-based 
audience comprising EU officials, diplomatic representatives, non-
governmental organisations and the private sector. The EPC-EFD 
Policy Dialogues focused in the following themes:
❯  On 22 March 2016, the day of the Brussels attacks, a Roundtable 
was held on Defining the phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation: 
Drivers and catalyst, local and global, with the participation of 
Rashad Ali, Head of Strategy, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 
Alexander Ritzmann, Chairman of the RAN Communication and 
Narrative Working Group and Executive Director of EFD, and 
Bakary Sambe, EFD Senior Fellow. (Video available at: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=QvRKF7vZujY).
Taking a closer look at the phenomenon:
RATIONALE AND STRUCTURE OF THE  
EPC-EFD PROJECT
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debates in Brussels, Belgium, looking at the various dimensions of 
jihadist radicalisation, and the role of the EU, its member states and 
other national and international policy actors in tackling such an 
emerging and alarming phenomenon.
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❯  On 14 April 2016, the EPC, EFD and CEP organised a Policy 
Dialogue on The Brussels terror attacks - Lessons learned and 
challenges ahead for Europe. Speakers included: Jorge M. Bento 
Silva, Deputy Head of Unit for Crisis Management and Fight 
against Terrorism, Directorate-General Migration and Home 
Affairs, European Commission; Pieter van Ostaeyen, independent 
analyst on Jihadi movements; Alain Winants, Advocate-General 
at the Belgium Supreme Court and Former Head of the Belgian 
State Security Service; and Alain Destexhe, Member of the 
Belgian Parliament. (Video available at: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_5HTZUBUZr0).
❯  On 25 May 2016, a two-session Policy Dialogue took place on 
The geostrategic aspects of jihadist radicalisation, featuring: 
Huseyin Bağcı, Professor of International Relations, Middle East 
Technical University, Ankara; Vlado Azinoviğ, Assistant Professor, 
Department of Peace and Security Studies, School of Political 
Science, University of Sarajevo; Zahid Hussain, journalist and writer; 
Elham Manea, Associate Professor of Political Science, University 
of Zurich; Ed Husain, Senior Advisor and Director of Strategy, Tony 
Blair Faith Foundation; Noureddine Fridhi, journalist, Brussels 
Bureau Chief of Al-Arabiya; and Clarisse Pasztory, Policy Adviser, 
European External Action Service (EEAS). (Videos available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoYBZ00IH4g and https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4HtBJVLJ2A).
❯  On 28 June 2016, Jihadist radicalisation in schools, universities, 
prisons and mosques: What challenges for Europe? was the focus. 
Kick-off speeches were delivered by Rupert Sutton, Research 
Director of Student Rights, The Henry Jackson Society, Muhammad 
Manwar Ali, Chief Executive of JIMAS, Rodrigo Ballester, Member of 
Cabinet of Tibor Navracsics, European Commissioner for Education, 
Culture, Youth and Sport, and Stefano M. Torelli, Research Fellow 
at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). (Video 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nepe47Um-Yk).
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❯  On 4 October 2016, a public event tackled “Jihad 2.0”: How to tackle 
on-line propaganda, radicalisation and recruitment? Andrea 
Plebani, Associate Research Fellow, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica 
Internazionale (ISPI), Tahir Abbas, Senior Research Fellow, Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI), David Ibsen, Executive Director, 
Counter-Extremism Project (CEP), and Lucinda Armstrong, Policy 
Officer, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 
European Commission, provided presentations followed by a 
debate with the audience. (Video available at: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=KZbiIcX3p0I).
❯  On 16 November 2016, the last Policy Dialogue of this series 
discussed Prevention of radicalisation in the EU - National 
experiences and best practice, thanks to the participation 
of Toria Ficette, Regional Coordinator on Polarisation and 
Radicalisation at the Brussels Observatory for Prevention and 
Security, Hazim Fouad, Analyst at the Unit for Islamism and 
Extremism, Free Hanseatic City-State of Bremen, Lucinda 
Creighton, Senior Consultant at the Counter Extremism 
Project (CEP), and Alexander Ritzmann, Chairman of the RAN 
Communication and Narrative Working Group and Executive 
Director of EFD. (Video available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jNHotpqLVIs).
Within this framework, the project also produced this multi-authored 
publication, drafted by leading experts and focusing on a variety of 
issues pertaining to the domestic and external dimensions of jihadist 
radicalisation
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In Chapter 1 “Defining the phenomenon of jihadist radicalisation: 
drivers and catalysts, local and global”, Elham Manea provides a 
detailed overview of the present academic debate over the meaning 
and scope of the radicalisation concept. She focuses in particular 
on the vocal confrontation that recently occurred between two 
leading scholars, Oliver Roy and Gilles Kepel. She then covers further 
contributions and theoretical models in the academic literature on 
the definition and root causes of jihadist radicalisation. She concludes 
by focussing on the ideological component of jihadist radicalisation, 
particularly Salafi Islamism in its Wahhabi version.
In Chapter 2 “The rise of extreme-right and jihadist radicalisation: 
How do they feed off each other?”, Matthew Goodwin holistically 
addresses the relationship between the two phenomena in the form of 
‘cumulative’ or ‘symbiotic’ extremism, focussing on three fundamental 
modes: mutual radicalisation, recruitment and spiral of violence. By 
drawing on examples from the UK, South Africa, Northern Ireland and 
the Middle East, he argues that policymakers should start tackling 
cumulative extremism by developing greater clarity and knowledge 
in six related areas: behaviour types, community polarisation or 
isolation, patterns of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation, multiple 
interaction groups, relationship with citizens’ perceptions, and how 
opposing extremisms respond to each other.
In the multi-author Chapter 3, “The geostrategic aspects of jihadist 
radicalisation”, Vlado Azinoviğ, Marwa Farid, Demir Murat Seyrek and 
Amanda Paul provide distinctive and well-informed analyses and 
viewpoints on various themes, dynamics and relevant challenges 
pertaining to jihadist radicalisation and violent extremism in the 
Western Balkans, Tunisia and Egypt, and Turkey.
In Chapter 4, “Understanding the nature of online extremist narratives”, 
Tahir Abbas focuses his analysis on the use of the internet, and particularly 
social media, by jihadist organisations such as ISIS/Daesh, Al-Qaeda 
and others to radicalise vulnerable youths in Europe and beyond. He 
resorts to sociological phenomena such as individual alienation, search 
for identity against the perceived threats of globalisation, and ‘digital 
tribalism’, to help explain the leveraging points of jihadist propaganda. 
He then looks into different motivations (i.e. humanitarian cause, 
democracy, Islamophobia, eschatology and identity) for individuals to 
Summary of key findings
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embrace jihad, and analyses similarities and differences between Al-
Qaeda’s Inspire and ISIS/Daesh’s Dabiq magazines. Finally, he criticises 
the current ‘counter-narrative’ and ‘removal’ strategies against online 
radicalisation, by advocating for more bottom-up and locally-specific 
approaches in this field.
In Chapter 5, “Radicalisation in schools and universities”, Rupert 
Sutton focuses on the jihadist radicalisation phenomenon affecting 
educational services in the UK. He first reflects on the main rationale 
and goals in the revision of the PREVENT strategy in 2011, while 
reporting on a number of recent episodes of radicalisation in schools, 
colleges and universities. He then identifies and elaborates on the main 
vulnerabilities of the UK’s educational services vis-à-vis radicalisation, 
and investigates the main psychological/existential factors contributing 
to the spreading of the phenomenon among Muslim youngsters in the 
UK. He concludes by reviewing the main UK policy responses to address 
radicalisation – namely, the protection of vulnerable youths and 
stronger resilience in the educational sector – and suggests further 
policy options that could be taken up by other EU member states.
In Chapter 6, “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) measures in 
Europe: Results and challenges”, Lorenzo Vidino identifies the key 
features of past and current CVE programmes across Europe. 
This includes general preventive measures, outreach/engagement 
measures, and individual interventions, focussing in particular on 
PREVENT and CHANNEL in the UK, Hayat in Germany and the city 
of Aarhus in Denmark. Thereafter, he points out the main common 
challenges to CVE national programmes, in particular the complexity 
of the radicalisation process, the need for partners and effective 
training, cooperation with credible and legitimate players in Muslim 
communities, and measuring effectiveness. He concludes by reflecting 
on the way forward, and the role of the EU.
Building on the key findings of each chapter, as well as on the 
main outcomes of the project’s event series, the Conclusions and 
Recommendations, drafted by Andrea Frontini, Alexander Ritzmann 
and Amanda Paul, provide policy advice to the EU and its member 
states on how to better tackle the challenges of jihadist radicalisation 
in four main priority areas: addressing the ideological roots of jihadist 
radicalisation, countering extremist propaganda and promoting 
positive alternative narratives, maximising intra-EU cooperation 
on counter-terrorism and radicalisation, and further streamlining 
counter-radicalisation efforts in EU’s foreign and security policy
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“We are ISIS.”
This was the title of an article written by former Kuwaiti Minister of 
Information, Saad bin Tafla al Ajami, published on 7 August 2014 by 
the Qatari newspaper al Sharq.1
The former Kuwaiti Minister was not celebrating the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), nor the atrocities that it was/is committing 
against civilians and minorities in Iraq and Syria. He was reminding 
his readers that ISIS, while condemned by the majority of Muslims, is 
a product of an Islamic religious discourse that has dominated the 
Muslim public sphere over recent decades — a mainstream discourse!
ISIS “did not come from another planet,” he said. “It is not a product 
of the infidel West or a bygone orient,” he insisted.
No, “the truth that we cannot deny is: ISIS learned from our schools, 
prayed in our mosques, listened to our media... and our religious 
platforms, read from our books and references, and followed Fatwas 
(religious edicts) we produced.”
The former Minister was addressing the role played by some Arab 
Gulf nations in mainstreaming a radical form of Islam, specifically 
Salafism, which provides, among others, the essence of Jihadists’ 
radicalisation religious worldview and narration.
Oddly enough, his message may well contribute to the on-going 
academic debate on the phenomenon of radicalisation and its root 
causes, namely the heated and controversial discussion between the 
two eminent French scholars, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy. How to 
define a phenomenon and its root causes is crucial to understand. 
It has clear ramifications if policymakers of the European Union (EU), 
US and Arab and Islamic countries are to succeed in confronting and 
defeating one of the main security challenges of the 21st century: 
Jihadi radicalisation. This task can prove to be difficult in a highly 
charged political context.
No, “the truth that we cannot deny is: ISIS learned from our schools, 
prayed in our mosques, listened to our media... and our religious 
platforms, read from our books and references, and followed Fatwas 
(religious edicts) we produced.”
1  Quoted in Manea, Elham, “Time to face the ISIS inside of US”, Human Rights Blog, 17 August, 2014, available at: https://
gmablog.org/2014/08/17/time-to-face-the-isis-inside-of-us/.
This chapter will attempt to chart an outline of the main conceptual 
positions on the term radicalisation, Jihadi radicalisation, and its 
drivers and catalysts both on local and global levels. The aim is to 
highlight that while these positions differ, they may, more than often, 
complement each other.
The charged public debate between Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy will serve as 
a main discussion point to the issue. A section will follow with an overview of 
the definitions existing in academic literature and policy papers on the term 
radicalisation and violent radicalisation. The third concluding session will provide 
a definition of Jihadi radicalisation and how scholarly differences in defining 
the phenomenon reflect on the policy measures designed to address it.
Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy - two distinguished French academics 
- do not need an introduction. Both have worked on the broader 
phenomenon of Islamism and offered valuable insights into violent 
radicalisation in Europe. Both have worked within the tradition of 
French sociology on radicalisation, have lists of books to their name, 
and years of on-the-ground experience in the Middle East, Central 
Asia and French suburbs. And both were colleagues and enjoyed 
a friendship over the course of their careers - one that came to an 
abrupt end with a public and messy confrontation.2
At the heart of their differences is a clash of analysis on the drivers and 
catalysts that pave the ground for the radicalisation and recruitment 
of French citizens of migrant background. Simply put, it is whether the 
spat of home-grown violence that gripped France in the last couple 
of years can be attributed to a radicalisation of Islam or an Islamisation 
of radicalisation.
Within their tradition of French sociology, Gilles Kepel and Olivier 
Roy have influenced the study of radicalisation by describing its 
overall cultural and socioeconomic context. Both have identified 
the marginalised dysfunctional French suburbs (banlieues) as the 
pool from which second and third-generation migrants are being 
radicalised. And both in essence agree that radicalisation of these 
youths is a process that seeks to reconstruct a lost identity in a 
perceived hostile and confusing world.3
An Islamisation of Radicalisation  
or the Radicalisation of Islam?
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It is how and in which context this radicalisation takes place that 
seems to set them apart (with an emphasis on the word seems). That 
difference was leaked out of academic circles and publicly argued 
and fought on newspaper platforms.
More than a week after the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) Jihadists 
massacred 130 people in Paris, Roy, who teaches at the European 
University Institute in Florence, Italy, published an op-ed in the 
newspaper Le Monde with the title ‘Jihadism is a generational and 
nihilist revolution’. He argued that the young French Muslims who 
committed this atrocity “did so less because they were Muslim than 
because they were young”. Radicalised French youth recruited by ISIS 
are seeking “a cause, a label, a grand narrative on which to slap the 
blood-stained signature of their personal revolt”. To him the real threat 
to France and the rest of the West is not ISIS, “which will sooner or later 
disappear like a mirage”, it is “the nihilistic and revolutionary reflexes of 
a certain cross-section of alienated youths”. They are rebels seeking a 
cause and, hence, what France and the rest of the West are facing is 
“not the radicalisation of Islam, but the Islamisation of radicalism”.4
Mr. Kepel, a professor at the prestigious Institut d’Etudes Politiques 
de Paris (Sciences-Po), reacted to Roy’s arguments with an article 
published in the newspaper Libération titled “The King Is Naked”, 
playing on the meaning of Roy’s name in French.5
In a strong language, he suggested that Roy first visits the suburbs from 
which these terrorists emerged – which have turned into hothouses 
for Salafism. Roy, Kepel argued, was just echoing the analysis first 
proposed by American specialists who, “knowing neither Arabic nor 
Arabs, declared that these acts of terrorism were the product of 
ruptures with their dominant societies”.6
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2  Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33:9, 2010, p. 799; Adam Nossiter, “That Ignoramus’: Two French Scholars of Radical Islam Turn Bitter Rivals”, 
New York Times, July 12, 2016. For some of their books see for instance: Kepel, Gilles, Terror in Frankreich, München: Verlag 
Antje Kunstmann, 2016; Kepel, Gilles, Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe, Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 1997; Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for an New Ummah, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.
3  Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 799.
4  Roy Olivier, “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste”, Le Monde, 24 November 2015, available at: http://
www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/24/le-djihadisme-une-revolte-generationnelle-et-nihiliste_4815992_3232.
html. Cited in Robert Zaretsky, “Radicalized Islam, or Islamicized Radicalism?”, Chronicle of Higher Education Review, 
May 26 2016.
5  Gilles Kepel, “«Radicalisations» et «islamophobie» : le roi est nu”, Libération, 14 March 2016, available at http://www.
liberation.fr/debats/2016/03/14/radicalisations-et-islamaphobie-le-roi-est-nu_1439535.
6  Robert Zaretsky, ibid; Gilles Kepel, “Le roi est nu”, ibid.
The school represented by Roy sees ISIS militants as no different from 
the members of the Red Brigades in Italy or Red Army Faction in West 
Germany during the 1970s: “The same rebellion, the same rupture, 
the same rupture with violence”.
Kepel considers this to be utter nonsense. To him, the mantra of 
‘radicalisation’ signifies ‘the absence of analysis’. He insists that Roy 
did not “hear the actual words pronounced by Salafist preachers in 
the suburbs, just as he had failed to read the tweets and tracts they 
were broadcasting”. Salafism, Kepel argued, must be taken seriously 
— even if this leads to accusations of ‘Islamophobia’.7
He cites a text, ignored by Roy and his followers, called The Global 
Islamic Resistance Call, which was written by Abu Musab al-Suri, a 
Syrian engineer and one-time functionary of Al-Qaeda who later 
broke with Osama bin Laden, and published in Arabic online in late 
2004 or early 2005. That text offers a glimpse into what he termed in 
his latest book as ‘third-generation jihadism’.8
First-generation Jihadism, which lasted from the 1970s to 1990s, was 
represented by the mujahedin in Afghanistan and the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIS) of Algeria. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation 
represents the second generation of Jihadism, which took over at 
the turn of the millennium. Third-generation Jihadism, introduced 
by al-Suri’s text, changed Al-Qaeda’s model from centrally planned 
attacks against large and symbolic targets to a bottom-up strategy. 
A strategy privileging the actions of independent and isolated 
groups, who are already integrated in the West. The attacks in Paris 
and Brussels might well reflect al-Suri’s destructive influence.9
“If you want to comprehend their functioning, you have to understand 
their background; you have to understand the intellectual resources 
of Salafism”, Kepel commented to a New York Times journalist.10
Mr. Roy responded to the same reporter, scoffing at his colleague’s 
reliance on Al- Suri‘s text: “Nobody is interested in al-Suri”. He added, when 
Mr. Kepel “talks of a ‘third generation in 2005,’ that is false, it is exactly the 
same profile as in the second generation — petty delinquency.” 11
While some argue that the public spat between the two scholars 
reflects in part the confrontational nature of French academia, often 
based on “schools of thought, fuelled by personal or institutional 
animosity”,12 the divergence in positions is hardly unique among those 
researching radicalisation and its violent version.
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Kepel, as it transpired from the previous review, was not exactly a 
fan of the term radicalisation. He called it a mantra that indicates 
an absence of analysis. While his disdain of the concept may not 
be globally shared, many scholars would agree that it has its share 
of critique. Lorenzo Vidino argued in his policy paper on “Jihadist 
Radicalisation in Switzerland” that the term has become extremely 
fashionable in the counter-terrorism community over the last decade. 
Its critics, however, see it as a concept that is “inherently arbitrary, 
lacking a common definition and often simply used to negatively 
connote ideas one does not like”.13
In his conceptual discussion and literature review of the terms 
radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation, Alex 
Schmid reminds his readers of the history of the term itself. The term 
“radical” started to be used in the 18th century and was often linked 
to the progressive values of the Enlightenment and the French and 
American revolutions of that period. It became widespread in the 19th 
century and referred to a political agenda advocating for systematic 
social and political reform. Overtime, it also came to signify the 
support for an extreme section of a party.14
JIHADIST RADICALISATION AND THE SEARCH  
FOR A DEFINITION
The term “radical” started to be used in the 18th century and was 
often linked to the progressive values of the Enlightenment and the 
French and American revolutions of that period... Overtime, it also 
came to signify the support for an extreme section of a party.14
7  Robert Zaretsky, ibid; Gilles Kepel, ibid. 
8  Kepel, Gilles “Terror in Frankreich”, p.11-15. The Arabic text of al-Suri can easily be found on the internet.
9  Gilles Kepel, ibid; Robert Zaretsky, ibid.
10  Adam Nossiter, ibid.
11  Ibid.
12  Robert Zaretsky, ibid.
13  Lorenzo Vidino, “Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland”, Center for Security Studies, Zurich: ETH, 2013, p.11.
14  Alex Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review”, 
ICCT Research, The Hague, March 2013, p. 6.
In other words, the term radicalisation changes overtime. It is a 
relative term. In the early 20th century, those who supported the 
Suffragette movement – giving women the right to vote - were called 
radicals. By the same token, what is considered radical in one culture 
may be considered moderate or even mainstream in another.15
The history of political ideas on the concept ‘radicalism’, Schmid 
argues, points to a definition of two main elements reflecting thought/
attitude and action/behaviour, respectively:16
❯  “Advocating sweeping political change, based on a conviction 
that the status quo is unacceptable while at the same time a 
fundamentally different alternative appears to be available to 
the radical;
❯  The means advocated to bring about the system-transforming, 
radical solution for government and society can be non-violent 
and democratic (through persuasion and reform) or violent and 
non-democratic (through coercion and revolution).
”Vidino insists that radicalisation, despite its shortcomings as a term, 
is useful to describe the dynamics related to the field of political 
violence. He identifies the definition of Charles E. Allen, which he 
describes as one of the most complete definitions, as it encapsulates 
many elements used by most scholars. Hence, radicalisation is 
‘‘the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the 
willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to 
effect societal change.’’17
Accordingly, scholars often distinguish two types of radicalisation:18
❯  Cognitive radicalisation: defined as the process through which 
an individual adopts ideas that are severely at odds with those 
of the mainstream, refutes the legitimacy of the existing social 
order, and seeks to replace it with a new structure based on a 
belief system that is completely different.
❯  Violent radicalisation: occurs when an individual takes the 
additional step of employing violence to further the views 
derived from cognitive radicalism.
When radicalisation is connected to violent extremism, Randy 
Borum argues that the limited professional literature available has 
mainly focused on the question of why (and, to a lesser extent, how) 
– “someone comes to adopt beliefs and behaviours that support his 
or her engagement in subversive and terrorist activities, particularly 
violence toward civilian non-combatants”.19
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Since 1960, academic research on the issue has sought the answer 
by investigating terrorist activity at different levels: individual, group, 
network, organisation, mass movement, socio-cultural context, and 
international/inter-state contexts. While 40 years of research have 
debunked the idea that only ‘crazy’ people engage in terrorism, most 
contemporary social scientists look at radicalisation and its violent 
outcome as a dynamic process. The nature of that process, however, 
remains poorly understood.20
Dalgaard-Nielsen looked at radicalisation in its connection to militant 
Islamism. She defines militant Islamism as a narrative of victimhood. 
It “claims that Islam and Muslims are constantly attacked and 
humiliated by the West, Israel, and corrupt local regimes in Muslim 
countries”. In order to return to a “society of peace, harmony, and 
social justice”, this narrative calls on Muslims “to stand up for their 
faith”. Violence, including violence against civilians, is religiously 
sanctioned and brings the fighter closer to God.21
Dalgaard-Nielsen moves to identify two theoretical frameworks used 
in researching this dimension. First, the French Sociology School, 
which argues that there is neither a single explanation of violent 
radicalisation, nor one single profile of radicals in Europe. It offers 
classical sociological factors – e.g. socio-economic marginalisation, 
lack of education, neighbourhood solidarity and peer pressure – to 
explain radicalisation not only of individuals from Europe’s lower social 
strata, but also of members of a well-off, apparently well-integrated 
Muslim middle class in Europe. This concerns individuals with no 
apparent lack of education, job opportunities, or resources to engage 
in constitutional politics.
The key contention of this group of sociologists is that “violent 
radicalisation arises out of the particular challenges faced by an 
increasingly Westernised generation of young Muslims in Europe, who 
attempt to carve out an identity for themselves”.22
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15  Lorenzo Vidino, ibid.
16  Alex Schmid, p. 8.
17  Lorenzo Vidino, pp.11-12.
18  Ibid.
19  Borum, Randy, “Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories”, Journal of Strategic Security, 
Article 2, Volume 4, Issue 4, Winter 2011, p. 14-15.
20  Ibid.
21  Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, p. 798.
22  Ibid, p. 800.
While both Roy and Kepel belong to this school of thought, they came 
to clash, as explained in the prior session, on the role of religious 
ideology in the radicalisation process of youths.
Second, the Social Movement Theory and Network Theory, which focus 
on the specifics of recruitment and processes of violent radicalisation. 
Scholars such as Quintan Wiktorowicz and Marc Sageman argue 
that “violent radicalisation is about who you know—radical ideas 
are transmitted by social networks and violent radicalisation takes 
place within smaller groups, where bonding, peer pressure, and 
indoctrination gradually changes the individual’s view of the world”.23
In other words, as Wiktorowicz’s research indicates, grievances and 
discontent do not automatically lead to action, or outright violent 
actions, for that matter. Instead, radicalisation is a social process that 
results from interaction with and within a radical group—a process 
by which the individual is gradually convinced that the perceived 
injustices require the individual to engage personally, and that violence 
is religiously sanctioned.24
These approaches and definitions look at specific dimensions of 
violent radicalisation in connection to militant Islamism. They agree 
that it is a process of some sort and try to understand what motivates 
an individual to engage in violent acts, but there is little consensus or 
clarity about how and when this takes place.
Acknowledging this divergence of opinions, the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, 
constructed a framework for understanding radicalisation, based on 
“three overlapping but distinct elements that motivate individuals to 
becoming radicalised or committing terrorist acts”.25 These are:
❯  The ideas of the radical narrative that provide a filter for 
understanding the world;
❯  The sociological factors that compel an individual to embrace 
this radical narrative; and
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These approaches and definitions look at specific dimensions  
of violent radicalisation in connection to militant Islamism. They agree 
that it is a process of some sort and try to understand what motivates  
an individual to engage in violent acts, but there is little consensus  
or clarity about how and when this takes place.
❯  The psychological factors, characteristics, pathologies, and 
triggers that may prompt an individual to use violence in order 
to promote or consummate this narrative.26
Psychologists and behavioural scientists at the Joint Military 
Information Support Center (JMISC) introduced a broader model. 
They surveyed existing conceptual models of radicalisation and 
associated empirical research and then presented their own model 
– one that highlighted the major components of the radicalisation 
process that different models appeared to have in common. The 
model identified the following, seven interacting components:27
❯  Motivations: Motivations may or may not be the ultimate 
why of violent activity. In this model, they function as an initial 
impetus. Motivations are composed of both push factors, such 
as grievances, and pull factors, which may serve as instrumental 
(e.g. money) or expressive (e.g. perceived importance) incentives.
❯  Socially-facilitated Entry: Introduction to extremist ideas and 
to an extremist collective occur through family, kinship networks 
or social institutions (schools, religious training centres, prisons).
❯  Splintering/Progression: Becoming a violent extremist is 
typically not an abrupt, one-time decision, but one that 
occurs incrementally over time. It should be seen as a gradual 
escalation, or as a series of discrete actions or decisions that 
prime an individual for what should occur at the next level.
❯  Intensification: This is a group-based framework. It explains an 
individual’s increase in extremism and deepening of commitment 
by in-group socialisation. Influence by a group leader and 
dynamics among its members shape an individual’s thoughts, 
feelings, and behaviours toward those of the group, and nurture 
intolerance for those outside the group.
❯  Ideology: The role of ideology spurs heated discussions. At its 
core is a narrative that follows some forms of a script about 
something that is wrong/not right and some person or entity to 
be blamed for it.
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23  Ibid, p. 801.
24  Ibid, 803.
25  Borum, Randy (Winter 2011), “Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: Conceptual Models and Empirical Research”, 
Journal of Strategic Security, Article 3, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp. 43-44.
26  Ibid.
27  Ibid, pp.44-45.
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The previous review has shown that, while scholars differ in their 
definitions of the terms radicalisation and violent radicalisation, most 
agree that the two refer to a process.
T. Stevens and P. Neuman sum up these definitions by saying:29
“ Most of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalisation 
as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups come 
to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for 
political aims. Some authors refer to ‘violent radicalisation’ in order 
to emphasise the violent outcome, and distinguish the process 
from non-violent forms of ‘radical’ thinking.”
This paper’s author agrees with the previous summary, defining 
radicalisation as a gradual process involving individuals or/and 
groups, which lead to an indoctrination into extreme ideas. It sees 
this process as a spectrum, in which resorting to violence is its last 
stage. Because the readiness to use violence is often experienced at 
the end point of that spectrum, an inherent component of this process 
is a cognitive radicalisation and indoctrination shaped by narratives 
propagated of radical forms of Islam, specifically Salafi Islam. Jihadi 
Islamism is, hence, defined as the violent form of radicalisation 
motivated and shaped by the narration of militant Salafism.
Jihadi radicalisation and implications for policymakers
❯  Threat/Defence: An out-group threat is a key factor binding the 
in-group together (key element of the narrative) and it suggests 
that violence is necessary to defend the cause or the in-group, 
and rationalises offensive action as ‘defensive’.
❯  Belonging/Identity: This element recognises that people 
sometimes are drawn to violent extremist ideologies and 
groups because they feel a need for belonging.This model uses 
a working definition of violent radicalisation drawing from the 
work of McCauley and Moskalenko, which views radicalisation as 
an “increased preparation for, and commitment to, intergroup 
conflict and violence… driven by changes in beliefs, feelings, and 
behaviours in directions that increasingly justify inter-group 
violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in-group”.28
Salafism is an orthodox Sunni movement, which emerged in the 1300s 
and was later revived in a distinct form in the 18th century, especially 
in Najd (a region in today’s Saudi Arabia) by founder of the Wahhabi 
movement Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. It advocates the strict 
practice of and absolute obedience to Islam as decreed (according 
to their interpretation) by the Prophet and the early generations of 
his followers. These are known as the Salaf, or the forefathers – hence 
the adjective Salafi. It rejects any form of mediation between God 
and the individual believer, and it strictly forbids the use of shrines or 
sculptures – a position that often led to their destruction wherever the 
Salafis came to power. It takes an intolerant fundamentalist stance 
towards non-Muslims and non-Salafis, and it obliges Muslims to 
distance themselves from them. It considers it an obligation of Muslims 
to respond to the call for holy war/Jihad and defines the conditions for 
such a response.30
Quintan Wiktorowicz, an expert on Salafism mentioned previously, 
differentiates between three strands of Salafism.31 The purists 
emphasise a focus on non-violent methods of propagation, purification 
and education. The politicos emphasise the application of the Salafi 
creed to the political arena, whereby the Jihadists take a militant position 
and argue that the current context calls for violence and revolution.
All of these three strands of Salafism, Wiktorowicz reminds us, share 
a common creed but offer different explanations of the contemporary 
world and, hence, propose different solutions. The splits, accordingly, 
are about contextual analysis, not belief.
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28  Ibid.
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That said, the Jihadist form of Salafism is as much shaped by the 
teachings of Salafi religious scholars as by radical writers of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. For example, Ayman-al-Zawahiri refers in his 
book Knights under the Prophets Banner to Sayyid Qutb’s concept of 
Hakimiyya32 as the “real spark of the Islamic revolution against the 
enemies of Islam inside and outside Islamic countries”.33 Similarly, the 
book of Al-Suri mentions Qutb, his trial and execution as part of the 
Islamic revolutionary struggle against the enemies of Islam.34
This brings us back to the significance of the ‘Kepel vs. Roy’ clash. 
Many observers, including this author, consider the clash overly 
exaggerated. In fact, the two complement each other.35 Roy would 
like policymakers to focus on the behaviour and psychology of the 
Jihadists who committed these atrocities – i.e. individuals alienated by 
their society. Kepel, while not at all disputing the alienation dimension, 
wants to expand the focus and look at the ideological/religious roots 
that radicalise these youths– namely, Salafism and its religious 
structures and tools. To him, the atrocities committed in France and 
Belgium are an expression of an Islamist radicalisation that took shape 
over decades, festering on segregation and lack of integration. In 
other words, Roy would like to focus on the individual and local drivers, 
whereas Kepel would like to expand our scrutiny of a global factor – the 
transnational Jihadi Islamism that feeds on these local drivers. Roy’s 
position provides a politically correct way to discuss a delicate issue, 
while Kepel would like to get to the bottom of it, even if that would 
offend the sensitivity of some Western liberal and leftist academics.
Interestingly, if not ironically, the assessment of the former Kuwaiti 
Minister of Information, Saad bin Tafla al Ajami, appears to support 
Kepel’s position. When he reminded his readers of Gulf monarchies’ 
mainstreaming of Salafi Islam, he was in fact stating quite clearly that 
their political survival tactics led to none other than a radicalisation of 
Islam
35
Matthew Goodwin, Professor of Politics and International Relations,  
University of Kent
The Rise of Extreme Right and Jihadist Radicalisation:
HOW DO THEY FEED OFF EACH OTHER?
One important but neglected area of research is what academics 
often refer to as ‘cumulative’ or ‘symbiotic’ extremism. This refers to 
an interaction between two different types of violent or non-violent 
extremism that might each be motivated by very different factors but 
use one another to facilitate their own campaigns, recruitment and, 
possibly, to trigger an outbreak of violence and intergroup conflict. 
The underlying idea is rooted in work by the academic Roger Eatwell 
a decade ago, who observed how an “important but neglected 
question in both the academic and policy spheres concerns how 
different forms of extremism are constructed in discourse by 
other extremists and how they relate in the more concrete world’. 
Moreover, Eatwell was interested in how “one form of extremism can 
feed off and magnify other forms”.
This discussion of cumulative extremism sparked considerable 
interest as it arrived at a time when radical and extreme right-wing 
movements in Europe were increasingly modifying their narratives 
and electoral strategy to include a stronger emphasis on Islamist 
terrorism. In the aftermath of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, it appeared 
that right-wing groups were devoting more effort in targeting public 
anxieties not merely over immigration and Islam but specifically 
the rising salience of religiously-inspired terrorism. Some such as 
academic Leonard Weinberg even suggested that the next major 
wave of violence or terrorism in Europe could well be a form of 
‘backlash’ politics among neo-nationalists who feel threatened by 
the rapidly rising rates of ethnic and cultural diversity.
Within this debate, some have also pointed to earlier examples of 
cumulative extremism such as the interplay between different groups 
in Northern Ireland or South Africa, and also to the interactions 
between right-wing extremists and anti-fascists in the United 
Kingdom in the early 1990s that were often accompanied with low level 
violence and harassment. From this discussion flowed several areas 
of interest that continue to attract attention but are also in need of 
further work if they are to be useful to policy and security communities.
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In the aftermath of the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, it appeared that right-
wing groups were devoting more effort in targeting public anxieties 
not merely over immigration and Islam but specifically the rising 
salience of religiously-inspired terrorism.
Perhaps the primary area of interest has been the interaction 
between religiously or Islamic State (ISIS)-inspired Islamist extremism, 
and the more politically motivated extreme right which was the initial 
area of focus of Eatwell. A few years after the publication of his essay, 
the English Defence League (EDL), which was formed specifically in 
response to the perceived threat from local Islamist groups in the town 
of Luton, Hertfordshire, and appeared to lend credence to call for 
more attention to this interaction. Shortly afterward, between 2009 
and 2012, the EDL inspired a number of similar movements across 
Europe that claimed to be campaigning specifically on a platform 
of opposition to the ‘Islamification’ of Western societies, and to the 
specific threat of religiously-inspired terrorism.
The underlying rationale behind this interest in cumulative extremism 
is to challenge a policy discussion that until now remained principally 
focused on examining individual forms of extremism in isolation, for 
example radical Islamism or right-wing extremism, rather than the two 
in combination. Though some government policies have been careful to 
discuss different forms of extremism at the same time, notably the UK 
government’s ‘Prevent’ agenda, critics have often suggested that the 
emphasis on the extreme right is more tokenistic than sincere. Academics, 
meanwhile, have continued to work on Eatwell’s initial proposition that it 
may yet become just as important to consider extremism in a far more 
holistic sense and to examine the various dynamics that are operating 
between and across different groups.
Since the initial discussion some researchers have sought to 
provide greater rigour to the concept of cumulative extremism. One 
example is work by Jamie Bartlett and Jon Birdwell who argue 
that cumulative extremism can be applied to varying degrees and 
types of relationships that two groups can potentially have with 
one another. These researchers have also shed light on the nature 
of possible interactions that policy and security communities may 
want to monitor. There are three interactions that are of interest - 
mutual radicalisation, recruitment and, at the more extreme end of 
the spectrum, a spiral of violence.
Considering the first type of interaction, it is often assumed that the 
relationship between religiously-inspired extremism and political 
extremism is one-dimensional, namely the political extreme right 
responding to the perceived threat of the ‘Islamification’ of European 
societies, or to the actions of a violent Islamist group. Yet as Bartlett 
and Birdwell note, there is actually very little work on the extent to 
which the direction of travel may flow the other way. One of the 
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more notable examples might be Anders Breivik who, while tracing 
his own violence to the perceived ‘threat’ from Islam and cultural 
Marxism, was also operating in an environment (i.e. Norway) where 
he was experiencing little interaction with Muslims or radical Islamist 
groups. But to what extent might the growing electoral support of 
populist radical right parties across Europe be contributing to the 
radicalisation of settled Muslims who might view such trends as 
evidence that they are not welcome in Western democracies? There 
is little, if any, research on this question. Similarly, to what extent are 
the strategies of populist parties and their ideological narratives 
either inspiring radical Islamists or featuring in their own call to arms?
The second type of interaction concerns recruitment where there is 
a need for policy and research communities to explore the extent 
to which, if at all, cumulative extremism assumes a significant role 
in individual pathways into extremism. For example, in the aftermath 
of major terrorist attacks, is there a significant surge of recruitment 
into right-wing extremist groups? And are radical preachers citing 
radical right groups and their support while encouraging Muslims to 
become more radical in their views? While there is some anecdotal 
evidence that hate crimes often surge following a terrorist attack, 
it is not entirely clear whether there is also a significant increase in 
the number of people who are pursuing a more radical response by 
enrolling in an extreme right party or defence league. Clearly, this 
requires thinking in very different ways about how we collect and 
analyse data relating to extremism.
The third and more direct form of interaction is the so-called ‘spiral 
of violence’ whereby different extremist groups engage in a tit-for-
tat conflict that escalates into violence. This is often rooted in the 
observation that while extreme groups publicly distance themselves 
from violence they also advocate narratives and ideologies that justify 
or legitimise violence under certain conditions. For example, it has been 
noted how right-wing extremist groups in Europe often cultivate a 
narrative of ethnic or white genocide, arguing that the very survival 
of the once dominant ethnic group is under threat, whether from 
immigration or Islam. This leads such movements to suggest that unless 
supporters take urgent and radical action then the survival of their 
The second type of interaction concerns recruitment where there  
is a need for policy and research communities to explore the extent  
to which, if at all, cumulative extremism assumes a significant role  
in individual pathways into extremism.
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children, grandchildren and race is not assured. At the most extreme 
end of the spectrum this might entail one extremist group bombing 
a location that is of symbolic importance to another extremist group 
(as regularly happens in Iraq and the Middle East), and that action 
triggering a counter-response. On a different level some academics 
such as Nigel Copsey argue that in earlier years, groups like the EDL 
sought to provoke violence and an over-reaction from minorities to 
foster segregation and divisions at the community level.
Beyond these arenas of interaction, however, are a series of 
additional questions that remain largely unresolved. A first question 
concerns the extent to which, if at all, narratives being cultivated by 
different groups are becoming entwined and mobilising supporters 
against ‘the other’. To what extent are claims about the threat of 
‘Islamic terrorism’ becoming just as important in the motivational 
vocabularies of the extreme right as traditional arguments over the 
perceived impact of immigration on Western democracies or the 
dangers of globalisation? Are we at, or approaching, a stage where 
the recruitment narratives are more focused on the activities of 
opposing extremist groups as opposed to broader complaints about 
the direction of society?
A second question concerns how security and policy communities can 
respond to the ‘real world’ manifestation of this challenge. In recent 
years, the potential for this form of extremism to cause problems has 
been underlined by several events. In the summer of 2012, Islamist 
extremists were arrested before undertaking a potentially lethal attack 
on a street rally by the EDL in Yorkshire. Later, in 2014, the growing 
salience of cumulative extremism was reflected in the aftermath of the 
murder of drummer Lee Rigby in 2014 when the extreme right-wing 
groups Britain First and the EDL reoriented their social media campaigns 
and offline demonstrations against violent Islamists and ISIS.
Unfortunately for policymakers and security makers, it is not easy to 
know when to intervene in these processes. In earlier years security 
officials would often argue that effective policing was the most 
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The third and more direct form of interaction is the so-called ‘spiral 
of violence’ whereby different extremist groups engage in a tit-for-
tat conflict that escalates into violence. This is often rooted in the 
observation that while extreme groups publicly distance themselves 
from violence they also advocate narratives and ideologies that justify 
or legitimise violence under certain conditions.
appropriate response to a movement like a defence league that was 
viewed more often as a public order rather than ‘extremist’ threat. Yet 
today such groups are also operating across multiple platforms, both 
offline and online, and so restricting the discussion of response to 
policing no longer seems adequate. The state of affairs is not helped 
by the glaring lack of new quantitative and qualitative research 
on the topic of cumulative extremism. To date there have been few 
detailed studies of this challenge.
In the short-term, and toward conclusion, one useful way forward has 
been outlined by Busher and Macklin who convincingly make the case 
for developing greater conceptual clarity. In particular, they outline six 
proposals regarding how the policy world can enhance the conceptual 
clarity of this debate about cumulative extremism. Their goal, rightly, 
is to encourage greater scrutiny of the claims that are made about 
this form of extremist activity and to avoid falling into the trap of it 
becoming ‘explanatory fiction’ – an idea that appears to explain 
a great deal but whose explanatory value is largely lost because it 
is applied in a very liberal sense to explain a great deal! It is worth 
reviewing the following six areas.
First, Busher and Macklin call for greater clarity regarding the type 
of behaviour that is being examined, namely whether it relates 
to ideological radicalisation (the narrative) or to action. Policy 
communities, they argue, should ensure that they explicitly describe 
what is or is not being treated as an indicator of cumulative extremism.
Second, policymakers should interrogate the relationship between 
the so-called ‘spiral of violence’ that can result from the process 
of cumulative extremism and wider processes of ‘community 
polarisation’ or isolation. In other words, rather than group everything 
together under one banner, policymakers should be sensitive to 
the fact that the core processes of cumulative extremism (i.e. an 
escalation of conflict between two groups) are quite different from 
the wider community processes, such as segregation or intergroup 
distrust, which these groups exploit and seek to worsen.
...  to encourage greater scrutiny of the claims that are made about  
this form of extremist activity and to avoid falling into the trap  
of it becoming ‘explanatory fiction’ – an idea that appears to explain  
a great deal but whose explanatory value is largely lost because  
it is applied in a very liberal sense to explain a great deal!
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Third, those monitoring such groups should be careful to document in 
detail the various patterns of mobilisation and counter-mobilisation. 
These are likely to be uneven and sporadic, with ‘peaks and troughs’ 
arriving in unpredictable patterns. Providing a concise record of 
the interactions could help us understand the broader evolution of 
extremist groups and identify moments when an escalation or conflict 
is more likely.
Fourth, acknowledge that extremist groups may be interacting with a 
broader range of actors than a single opposing group. It might be, for 
instance, that a right-wing extremist group is engaging as forcefully 
with sections of tabloid media, or police, as it is with radical Muslim 
preachers. Focusing narrowly on the interactions between extremist 
groups may negatively impact on our understanding of how these 
groups operate within a broader milieu.
Fifth, work on cumulative extremism would be well positioned by 
also considering the way in which narratives coincide with wider 
popular perceptions of challenges in society, such as the salience 
of immigration or grievances among settled Muslims. As the 
environment changes, so too will the focus of the narratives and the 
potential for interaction and conflict.
Lastly, researchers should examine not simply whether two or more 
opposing groups are responding to one another, but specifically how 
they are doing so and the differential impacts that these groups have 
on one another. Is the response limited to narratives of mobilisation 
or is the response rooted more in symbolism or calls to action?
Within this area, therefore, there remains much to be done. With the 
issue of political violence and terrorism becoming more salient, those 
who are working in policy and security communities may want to 
address these questions sooner rather than later
Acknowledge that extremist groups may be interacting with a broader 
range of actors than a single opposing group. It might be, for instance, 
that a right-wing extremist group is engaging as forcefully with sections 
of tabloid media, or police, as it is with radical Muslim preachers.
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THE GEOSTRATEGIC ASPECTS  
OF RADICALISATION
Overall, it is believed that from the end of 2012 until the beginning 
of 2016, up to 1,000 individuals from countries in the Western 
Balkans travelled to Syria and Iraq. This figure includes people who 
are thought to have either remained there, returned home, or died, 
and also includes non-combatants such as women, children and 
the elderly. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Albania, and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have provided the 
bulk of fighters in the Western Balkans contingents in Syria and Iraq.1
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The foreign fighter phenomenon in the Western Balkans – 
key figures and trends
1  European Policy Centre, as standard practice follows the European Commission in the usage of FYROM to denote the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
BALKAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 2012-2015 (SOURCE: ATLANTIC INITIATIVE, MAY 2016)
COUNTRY TOTAL 2012-2015 RETURNED KILLED WOMEN CHILDREN STILL IN SYRAQ
ALBANIA 136 401 20 N/A N/A 762
BiH 260
43 men
6 women
44 men
2 women
56 N/A
77 men
48 women
46 children
CROATIA 1 - - 1 N/A 1
FYR MACEDONIA 1353 80 204 N/A N/A 35
KOSOVO 314
110 men
1 child
6 women
57 38 27
75 men
38 women
27 children
MONTENEGRO Up to 30 5
SERBIA 42 95 11 N/A N/A 22
SLOVENIA 3 + 36 2 1 + 17 2 5
2 women
5 children8
1  Out of these, 33 are suspected of being engaged in fighting or military 
training.
2  Out of this number, 24 are considered as fighters. The rest are family 
members or supporters.
3  Macedonian security services estimate that the share of women  
in this contingent is close to 10%.
4  The official figure is 17.
5  Three out of nine returnees are in custody, and are being tried before 
Serbian court. Another three FTF are being tried in absentia.
6  Three Slovenian citizens, and three men with either dual Slovnian/Bosnian 
citizenships or places of birth in Slovenia.
7  One Slovenian, Jure Korelec, and Denis Delanovic´, with dual Slovenian/
Bosnian citizenship.
8  Two women married to Bosnian men, and thier five children.
THE GEOSTRATEGIC ASPECTS OF JIHADIST 
RADICALISATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS
Vlado Azinovic´, Associate Professor in the Department of Peace and Security Studies,  
School of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo
The pace of departures of citizens from this region to Syria and Iraq 
slowed in 2015 and almost ground to a halt by early 2016. Returns 
from Syria and Iraq, however, also almost ceased completely in 2015, 
beyond a few extraditions from detention in Turkey. This decline in both 
departures and returns was potentially the result of intensified regional 
and international efforts to criminally prosecute aspiring fighters and 
returnees.2 The reduction may also be linked to developments in 
conflict zones, which are now more difficult to cross into and out of.
Compared to contingents from other countries, the Western Balkans’s 
detachment in Syria and Iraq is older (on average men were 31 and 
women were 30 years of age on the date of their entry into Syria) and 
includes more women. Among Kosovars and Bosnians, respectively, 
women make up 27% and 31% of each country’s contingent – nearly 
double the European average. As a consequence, non-combatants 
make up far more (up to 55%) of the Western Balkans contingent than 
is true of other foreign contingents in Syria and Iraq. The character of 
the contingent can be attributed to the rhetoric of ISIL and calls to its 
followers to undertake hijra (migration). In response, entire families, 
sometimes three generations, are migrating from the Western 
Balkans, and many have no intention of ever returning.
Whilst a unique profile of the typical Western Balkans foreign fighter 
remains elusive, there are commonalities that can be understood as 
patterns: (1) links to diasporas in the EU (particularly in Austria and 
Germany), and (2) pre-departure criminality. Other factors that feature 
in the lives of many fighters include: lack of education, unemployment, 
dysfunctional or broken families, and mental health issues. A closer 
look into dozens of individual cases strongly indicates that motives for 
migration to Syria and Iraq most often include a mixture of personal 
drivers alongside overarching ideological incentives. Typically, people 
who depart are either escaping something (be it unhappy marriages, 
domestic violence, debt, criminal prosecution, alcohol, or drug abuse), 
or are seeking something (such as a spouse, an adventure, or a 
belonging and purpose in life). At the same time, they have complied 
with what they see as a divine order.
Motivation and recruitment – key patterns  
and trajectories
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2  The countries of the Western Balkans have been successful in arresting and prosecuting foreign fighters and members of 
their support networks. By late summer 2016, there have been 93 guilty verdicts in the region, with another 35 suspects 
on trial: Bosnia has found 12 people guilty and has another 8 currently on trial for participating in terrorist organisations 
and travelling to Syria in support of ISIL; Kosovo has indicted over 75 people and has obtained guilty dispositions in 
over 50 cases, with the rest facing trial; in Macedonia, there are now 18 guilty dispositions on foreign fighter-related 
charges; and in 2016, Albania convicted 9 people for recruitment and participation in terrorist organisations, and 
financing foreign terrorist fighters. Derived from the opening remarks of US Ambassador to Albania Donald Lu at the 
State Department and OSCE Table Top Exercise “Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Irregular Migration Routes: Prevention 
and Resilience,” Durres, Albania, 13-15 September 2016.
3  In BiH, these developments have been additionally reinforced over the last two years by an influx of tens of thousands 
of Arab tourist dollars and investments, mostly from Gulf countries. Bosnian Salafis are often hired to accomodate the 
needs of these tourists, serving as drivers, guides, and even real estate agents.
4  The Islamic Communities in Albania, BiH, FYROM, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are non-governmental religious 
organisations that govern the practice of Muslims living in these countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire. 
Ideological radicalisation and recruitment for departures to Syria and 
Iraq, at one time centred in traditional Salafi strongholds in the remote 
areas of BiH, FYROM, Kosovo, and Albania, has gradually but visibly 
moved into new and less formal communities and congregations, 
which have mushroomed over the last couple of years in and around 
major cities. This trend is especially apparent in BiH where many 
suburban areas around Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Travnik and Bihağ are 
now harbouring Salafi settlements, and similar developments have 
been observed in Kosovo and FYROM. Indeed, a whole network of 
small businesses, community centres, and charities are financially 
facilitating this relocation effort, with “pop-up” mosques that 
increasingly provide spiritual guidance.3
Individual cases of radicalisation and recruitment are occurring by and 
large within closed circles that include only family and friends, during 
social gatherings that typically take place in the privacy of peoples’ 
homes. These gatherings are for religious purposes and thus amount 
to “illegal” or “parallel” mosques, or “para-jamaats” as the official Islamic 
Communities (ICs) in the region have labelled them. They are now 
considered by many as hotbeds of radicalisation and recruitment in 
BiH, Albania, Kosovo, and FYROM.4 In addition to the establishment 
of parallel religious communities, these groups are gradually setting 
Individual cases of radicalisation and recruitment are occurring  
by and large within closed circles that include only family and friends, 
during social gatherings that typically take place in the privacy of 
peoples’ homes.
up parallel structures in other vital areas, such as in education, social 
services and healthcare, thus filling the gaps left, in many instances, 
by fragile or dysfunctional states and by public services plagued by 
incompetence, corruption, and nepotism.5
The radicalisation process typically begins through initiation with a 
“human touch,” meaning through personal interaction with a figure 
of authority. It is then followed by peer-to-peer interaction, often 
with like-minded individuals, whereby a very specific worldview is 
reinforced through group dynamics. The role of social media and the 
Internet in individual cases of radicalisation in the Western Balkans 
appears to be only tertiary in importance, serving as a force multiplier.
The most critical stage in the radicalisation process, especially for 
the youngest recruits, is physical separation from their biological 
families and inclusion into a new ideological family. This new family 
provides them respect, care, support, and often money – things they 
may have previously felt deprived of. Once this process of separation 
is complete, the biological family, the last and potentially most 
powerful force capable of countering or disrupting the radicalisation 
cycle, is no longer an obstacle, and the radicalisation process can 
continue virtually unhindered.
Even a cursory look into this process strongly suggests that vulnerable, 
traumatised individuals with a history of unaddressed mental health 
issues are likely to fall easy prey to radicalisation efforts. Indeed, 
there are documented instances of such individuals seeking and 
receiving help for their mental health problems through “alternative 
treatments” (known as ruqya, which is reminiscent of exorcism) 
performed by uncertified imams. Dozens of individuals who have 
undergone such “treatment” have departed soon afterward to Syria 
and Iraq, where some have lost their lives.6
Overall, the motivations among indigenous Muslims in the Western 
Balkans for departures to Syria and Iraq, and generally for radicalisation 
into violent jihadism, differ from those in immigrant Muslim communities 
in the West, and cannot be attributed to the same driving factors, 
The most critical stage in the radicalisation process, especially  
for the youngest recruits, is physical separation from their biological 
families and inclusion into a new ideological family. This new family 
provides them respect, care, support, and often money – things they 
may have previously felt deprived of.
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such as economic deprivation, social marginalisation, or a failure 
to integrate. In many instances, the incentive is identity-driven, as 
increasing numbers of mostly Bosnian and Albanian (especially in 
Kosovo and FYROM) youth are told that their respective ethnic groups 
will only be safeguarded from further suffering and humiliation by 
adherence to what is sold as “authentic Islam”, practiced by the first 
generations of Muslims.
In essence, the overarching goal of militant Salafism in the region is 
to hijack the ethnic identities of Bosniaks and Albanians, each rich 
with centuries of tradition and a culture of tolerance, with the aim 
to eventually reduce them to nothing more than a single religious 
identity. To accomplish this, the rhetoric of radical Salafi ideologues 
is typically focused on eradicating pre-existing belief systems and 
cultural identities. Given the generally confrontational nature of 
the ideology and of many of its adherents, this is likely to remain a 
significant source of antagonism and conflict in the region even after 
the foreign fighter phenomenon subsides. Thus, radicalisation into 
militant Salafism should be expected to continue to produce new 
security threats in the Western Balkans.
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Given the generally confrontational nature of the ideology and  
of many of its adherents, this is likely to remain a significant source  
of antagonism and conflict in the region even after the foreign fighter 
phenomenon subsides. Thus, radicalisation into militant Salafism 
should be expected to continue to produce new security threats  
in the Western Balkans.
5  Bosnian law enforcement agencies are aware of at least one such “parallel” daycare center in a Sarajevo suburb 
that regularly shows ISIL videos of the beheadings of captured hostages from the West. Children attending the 
center are reportedly instructed to stand up and cheer these acts.
6  Husein Bilal Bosnic´, who was considered one of the most influential Salafists in the Western Balkans until his arrest 
in the autumn of 2014, was well known for his performances of ruqya. People from outside BiH (from Slovenia, Italy, 
Austria, and elsewhere) sought out Bosnic´’s “treatment.” In some cases, individuals reportedly departed to Syria and 
Iraq almost immediately after receiving ruqya, at least six of whom have died there. In November 2015, the Court of BiH 
sentenced Bosnic´ to 7 years in prison for publicly encouraging Salafi adherents to join ISIL. To watch a ruqya treatment 
given by Bosnic´, see (in Bosnian): “Rukja – Lijec˘enje Kur’anom – istjerivanje d¯inna/šejtana [Ruqyah – Qur’an Healing 
– castingout jinn and Satan], Bilal Bosnic´,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SW1-rXWfnuo (accessed April 2, 2016).
Current security threats to the region emanate mostly from returned 
foreign fighters and from radicalised or ideologically inspired 
individuals, who have tried and failed to travel to Syria and Iraq. 
Even prior to the series of terrorist attacks that struck different parts 
of the world in 2015 and 2016, and which involved the participation of 
returnees from the Syrian and Iraqi war theatres, the return of foreign 
fighters from Middle Eastern battlefields had been anticipated with 
unease, and even some fear. Interestingly, however, it turns out that 
individuals with a tremendous desire to travel to Syria and Iraq, but 
the inability to do so, may present an equal or even bigger security 
threat. Some of these unaccomplished warriors, who were unable to 
set foot in ISIL-held territory, have carried out terrorist attacks in their 
communities instead. In fact, ISIL propaganda frequently addresses 
such individuals, offering the possibility of redemption to those 
who are faced with an unbridgeable gap between their desire and 
capability to heed the call to battle in Syria and Iraq, by encouraging 
them to deploy on the home front.7
In order to assess this security threat in the Western Balkans, it 
is important to understand how ISIL perceives the region and its 
position in ISIL’s plans to move forward. The region does not appear 
to be among the areas identified by ISIL in strategic documents as 
requiring the use of mass and indiscriminate violence, as designated 
to France, Belgium and other Western European countries. On the 
contrary, ISIL appears to see the Western Balkans as a “non-priority” 
area, viewed as suitable for the rest and recuperation or recruitment 
of new fighters, and for their transfer to or from Western Europe, as 
well as for the acquisition of weapons, ammunition and explosives. 
Therefore, ISIL does not seem to be encouraging Paris or Brussels-
like attacks in BiH, of an indiscriminate nature and directed against 
civilians, but rather limited strikes against selected targets (such as 
foreign embassies or diplomats, as suggested by ISIL’s magazine 
Dabiq in August 2015).8
Nevertheless, religious authorities and security officials in the region 
may also become the focus of extremists. Moderation, or middle-path 
Islam, has for centuries been the cornerstone of the belief system, 
identity, and way of life of Muslims in the Western Balkans. This 
tradition, along with the secular states that enable and safeguard it, 
Security risks and threats stemming  
from the foreign fighter phenomenon
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7  At the time of this writing, an armed group of at least seven militant Salafis, of whom three are returnees from Syria and 
at least one was prevented from travelling there, are in hiding in North-Central Bosnia, where they have evaded police for 
weeks. They are considered heavily armed and extremely dangerous.
8  In the August 9, 2015 issue of Dabiq, ISIL offered an additional rationale for “noble deeds” accomplished off the battlefield 
noting that: “the Muslim who is unable to perform hijrah…[can] strike out against the kafir enemies of the Islamic 
State… In addition to killing crusader citizens anywhere on the earth, what, for example, prevents him from...targeting 
the Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia? Or targeting Saudi diplomats in Tirana, Sarajevo, and 
Pristina?” See: “From the Battles of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions,” Dabiq, August 9, 2015. Available at: https://azelin.
files.wordpress.com/2015/09/the-islamic-statee2809cdc481biq-magazine-11e280b3.pdf (accessed October 2, 2015).
9  From an interview with a Bosnian judical source who spoke under the condition of anonymity. 
10  The article states that “one must either take the journey to daˉr al-Islaˉm, joining the ranks of the mujaˉhidı¯n therein, 
or wage jihaˉd by himself with the resources available to him (knives, guns, explosives, etc.) to kill the crusaders 
and other disbelievers and apostates, including the imaˉms of kufr, to make an example of them, as all of them are 
valid – rather, obligatory – targets according to the Sharı¯’ah, except for those who openly repent from kufr before 
they are apprehended.” See: “Kill the Imams of Kufr in the West,” Dabiq, April 13, 2016. Available at: https://www.
clarionproject.org/docs/Dabiq-Issue-14.pdf (accessed April 23, 2016).
could be further undermined and targeted by ISIL-inspired groups 
and individuals. In light of the ongoing crackdown on para-jamaats 
instigated by the ICs in Albania, BiH, FYROM, and Kosovo, a possible 
retaliatory attack against representatives of these communities 
cannot be excluded. In the words of a high-ranking counter-terrorism 
official from the region, “I am afraid that the next terrorist attack will 
occur in a mosque.”9
Antagonism toward moderate imams was vividly encouraged in the 
April 2016 issue of Dabiq magazine. ISIL followers were invited to “kill 
the imams of kufr (infidels)” and were reminded of their obligation to 
either emigrate to the “caliphate” or kill infidels in other places. The 
article went so far as to call these imams “justified and mandatory 
targets in accordance with Sharia Law, which should serve as 
examples to others.”10
Nevertheless, religious authorities and security officials in the region 
may also become the focus of extremists. Moderation, or middle-path 
Islam, has for centuries been the cornerstone of the belief system, 
identity, and way of life of Muslims in the Western Balkans.
With a significant high rate of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, Western 
Balkan countries have been considerably impacted by this phenomenon. 
Yet, public awareness of the problem remains somewhat limited, as well 
as any commitment at the society level to actively prevent and counter 
radicalisation. Efforts to educate and engage citizens to recognise and 
respond to radicalisation should be undertaken.
Countries in the Western Balkans have not yet developed 
standardised risk assessment tools to help differentiate the relative 
threat of returning foreign fighters. Like other countries faced with 
the same challenge, the region is suffering from a knowledge gap 
and must carry out more thorough evaluations of these returnees. A 
growing number of former foreign fighters, as well as their handlers 
and facilitators and those who aspired to join them, are being tried and 
sentenced to prison terms in the region. In spite of this, where and how 
these convicts should be placed within their respective prison systems 
remains uncertain, and clear policies standardising the treatment 
of this special population must urgently be put into practice so that 
prisons in the region do not become new hotbeds of radicalisation. 
Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for foreign fighters and 
their families must also be standardised and implemented post-haste.
It is becoming obvious that more research is needed on the intricacies 
of radicalisation and recruitment processes, which involve complex 
dynamics at various levels. With a lack of prior experience in dealing 
with these sorts of security related risks and threats, understanding of 
their causes and drivers is too often based on assumptions and not on 
researched-based knowledge. Several international projects currently 
underway in the region, ostensibly aimed at preventing and countering 
radicalisation into violent extremism (CVE), are based solely on such 
Future challenges and recommendations
It is becoming obvious that more research is needed on the intricacies 
of radicalisation and recruitment processes, which involve complex 
dynamics at various levels. With a lack of prior experience in dealing 
with these sorts of security related risks and threats, understanding  
of their causes and drivers is too often based on assumptions and not 
on researched-based knowledge.
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dubious assumptions. Whilst international assistance and know-how in 
CVE are welcome and at times invaluable, locally-owned programmes 
and policy development projects (involving indigenous experts with an 
authentic understanding of the local context, mentality, and tradition) 
stand a better chance of producing effective and lasting results.
An evidence-based policy development centre, perhaps with regional 
participation and focus, would also be a welcome addition to any genuine 
CVE effort. However, the likelihood of this seems rather unrealistic, for, 
as one high-ranking Western diplomat in Sarajevo recently observed, 
“We do not support research. We only support policies.”
Yet, this half-empty approach may be part of the problem. It is indicative 
that radicalisation into militant Salafism in the Western Balkans has 
been most prevalent and has occurred most rapidly in countries 
marred by fragile internal structure, administrative dysfunctionality, 
frozen conflict, and unresolved identity and governance issues. Such 
states often produce underachieving and failing societies, polarised 
and unfit to protect and restore the eroding system of common-sense 
values and norms on which they were once based. To believe that 
such societies could alone produce an effective counter-narrative to 
deter extremist ideologies is as naïve as it is improbable.
A more steadfast commitment to European Union accession may 
help countries in the Western Balkans restore traditional values by 
providing a unified narrative and, more importantly, the prospect 
of a better future – a promise that still resonates with the vast 
majority of citizens in the region. If met with an adjusted attitude 
regarding the integration process for these countries, still relying on 
conditionality but also recognising the need for pre-emptive action, 
real progress could potentially be achieved; for example, by enabling 
early negotiations on key EU Chapters 23 (Judiciary and fundamental 
rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security). This would underpin 
the necessary and attainable goal of establishing societies based 
on political accountability, competence and justice, which would 
embolden efforts to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism. 
Before this happens, however, the EU will need to reinvent its strategy 
for Western Balkans accession, and political elites in the region will 
need to evolve beyond hypocritical attitudes to instead work in the 
true best interests of their respective constituencies
THE THREAT OF JIHADIST RADICALISATION  
IN TURKEY
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Turkey is a secular country with a predominantly Muslim population. 
Secularism has been the cornerstone of modern Turkey since the 
Republic was founded in 1923. It is one of the core principles of the 
constitution and pro-secular groups remain quite strong, although 
in recent times they have come under enormous pressure. Over the 
last 15 years secularism has been visibly weakened by the ruling 
conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP). Yet, while many 
secular Turks see the AKP as a threat to the secular regime, Jihadist 
organisations continue to consider Turkey under AKP rule as an un-
Islamic Western country, and thus, as a target for attacks.
Over the last three decades Turkey has been attacked by both 
homegrown (i.e. Turkish Hezbollah and IBDA-C (the Great Eastern 
Islamic Raiders’ Front)) and international radical groups (such as Al 
Qaida and the so-called Islamic State (ISIS)). Such terror attacks are 
not new to Turkey but their dynamics and intensity have changed 
over the last two years as a consequence of the Syrian Civil War, 
with ISIS becoming the most deadly foreign terrorist threat. Other 
Syrian-based terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, which has 
established links in Turkey, also hold the capacity to carry out attacks 
in Turkey, but so far have not done so.
As Ankara intensified its involvement in anti-ISIS operations, the 
blowback from ISIS increased. The first upsurge came following 
the agreement between Turkey and the US on 22 July 2015 on the 
use of the Incirlik airbase by the US and the coalition forces in the 
fight against ISIS. The threat increased further following Turkey’s 
intervention in Syria with its Euphrates Shield operation in August 
2016. Turkey became the only NATO country with ground forces 
fighting against ISIS. Urban and heavily populated areas have been 
key targets - including the Reina night club in Istanbul, which was 
attacked in the early hours of 1 January 2017.
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In addition to carrying out numerous terrorist attacks, ISIS has used 
Turkey as a base for recruitment, logistical support and the transit 
of foreign fighters from Europe and elsewhere. According to official 
figures some 2,000-2,200 Turkish foreign fighters are estimated 
to have joined ISIS in Syria, although the real number is potentially 
higher.1 ISIS, other jihadist and Islamist groups in Turkey, Turkish 
foreign fighters in Syria and other foreign fighters connected to ISIS 
represent a major threat to Turkey.
Moreover, there are many ISIS sympathisers in Turkey. In 2016, more 
than 1,300 people were arrested because of their links to ISIS.2 The fact 
that the Turkish authorities only began to view jihadist radicalisation 
as a major threat some two years ago has allowed the group to 
strengthen and consolidate jihadist networks and cells in the country. 
Moreover, while now there is an active fight against ISIS, it is carried out 
from a predominantly security perspective. There is no comprehensive 
long-term strategy to tackle this issue and address the root causes of 
radicalisation. This needs to be urgently rectified if the authorities are 
going to successfully put an end to the almost back-to-back terrorist 
attacks that have plagued the country for the last few years and left 
hundreds of people dead. Furthermore, if the Turkish authorities fail to 
counter the threat of radicalisation, it may have serious consequences 
for Europe and beyond. In this sense, it should not only be a local 
concern, but also needs to be taken seriously by the EU, which should 
increase cooperation with Turkey. 
The fact that the Turkish authorities only began to view jihadist 
radicalisation as a major threat some two years ago has allowed  
the group to strengthen and consolidate jihadist networks  
and cells in the country.
1  Soufan Group “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq”, 2015, p. 10.
2  Statement by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Turkey on 28 December 2016, http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/
haber/1342111-2016da-deasla-irtibatli-bin-313-kisi-tutuklandi, last accessed: 12 January 2017.
Radical views and movements have never played an important role 
in the Turkish understanding of Islam. Religious orders (tarikat) and 
other religious groups have played a significant role in Turkey since 
the Seljuk Empire (1037). They became important actors in social and 
religious life in the Ottoman Empire. However, the Sufi tradition, a 
spiritual and tolerant understanding of religion, was at the core of 
all these orders and groups. Radical views were not acknowledged 
in these organisations and the Empire’s understanding of Islam. 
Although sultans regularly used the concept of jihad to conquer new 
territories, it was a way to justify imperial aspirations. Moreover, the 
term also brings back bad memories for many Turks because even 
though Ottoman Sultan Mehmet V declared jihad against the Triple 
Entente in 1914, the Arabs joined the British Forces against the 
Ottomans, which ultimately led to the end of the empire.
Modern Turkey was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as a secular 
republic in 1923. Atatürk blamed the demise of the empire in part on 
the religious leadership, which had gained more power in the 18th 
and 19th centuries at the expense of the sultans and opposed the 
modernisation of the Empire. The Caliphate was abolished in 1924 
and all religious orders and lodges were closed and banned in 1925 
as part of the reform process. Turkish secularism is based on the 
separation of the state and religion, although the state organises 
and controls religious activities. The Diyanet, the Directorate for 
Religious Affairs, has been responsible for implementing this since 
1924. However, major religious orders continued to exist. First, they 
functioned underground, and then they were tolerated by different 
central right and conservative governments from 1950 onwards with 
the multi-party system.
Not only were such organisations tolerated, they were sometimes even 
supported, in line with the Western strategy to counter communism 
and extreme-left groups from 1960s onwards. Moreover, a strong 
ideological element was introduced with the emergence of political 
Islam at the end of 1960s.
Radical terrorist groups as we understand them today began to 
emerge in the early 1980s with the appearance of IBDA-C and Turkish 
Hezbollah. Influenced by the Islamic Revolution and regime change in 
neighbouring Iran, their goal was to turn the secular regime into an 
Historical background
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Islamic one. Many secular intellectuals and journalists, like Cetin Emec, 
Bahriye Ucok, Ugur Mumcu, Ahmet Taner Kislali, were assassinated by 
these terrorist groups in the 1990s. While these were Sunni groups, 
many researchers, including the assassinated intellectuals, claimed 
that they received support from Iran, in an attempt to export the 
revolution and destabilise Turkey. One of the most common slogans 
of secular groups in Turkey against such attacks and the rise of 
political Islam in the 1990s was “Turkey will not become Iran”. For 
Turkey’s military-dominated establishment, the Islamic Republic, 
a revolutionary theocracy, was the antithesis of Ataturk’s secular 
republic. Not only did it seek to overturn the regional geopolitical 
order but, in the eyes of the Turkish elite, it threatened the identity and 
very existence of the Turkish state.3
When Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, nickname Mujahid Erbakan, and 
his Refah (Welfare) Party came to power in June 1996 in a coalition 
government, it was the first time in the Republic’s history that an 
Islamist leader became prime minister. Erbakan’s calls for Turkey’s 
withdrawal from NATO and the introduction of an economy based on 
Islamic precepts was greeted with fear from the secular establishment, 
including the armed forces. This led to a raft of ultra-secular policies, 
with the direct and indirect involvement of the armed forces.
The military took a very strong stand against Erbakan and the Refah 
party, with Turkey’s generals openly voicing their discontent, even 
to the extent of reprimanding local administrators of the party and 
accusing Erbakan of trying to introduce an Islamic regime. The chief 
of general staff organised briefings to which top level bureaucrats, 
3  Larrabee, F. Stephen and Nader A. (2013), “Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East”, RAND Corporation, 2013 p. 1.
Erbakan’s calls for Turkey’s withdrawal from NATO and the introduction 
of an economy based on Islamic precepts was greeted with fear from 
the secular establishment, including the armed forces. This led to a raft 
of ultra-secular policies, with the direct and indirect involvement of the 
armed forces.
journalists and academics were invited and briefed about the threat 
to the republic by the rise of political Islam (including the incumbent 
government, the Islamist media, Islamist financial and economic 
institutions, and Imam-Hatip schools)4.
The armed forces carried out a political struggle not only against 
the government but also against Islamist groups such as tarikats, 
Islamic business and media. For example, the military urged the 
government not to allow Islamist companies to enter public bids 
and to ban purchases from these companies. Tension between the 
armed forces and the government climaxed on 28 February 1997 
when the National Security Council (NSC) convened for a regular 
meeting and the generals introduced 18 steps to eliminate the 
danger of Islamic fundamentalism. The key elements were related to 
education reform, the reorganisation of religious education, stopping 
accusations against Atatürk, as well as public anti-secular activities, 
and redefining the relationship between Iran and Turkey.
One of the most important measures was the closure of many of 
Turkey’s publicly-run religious seminaries and Quran courses. The 
NSC also demanded the government clamp down on all privately-run 
religious courses and ensure that they come under the direct control 
of the education ministry. There were seen as centres of radicalisation 
and indoctrination. Ultimately Erbakan was forced to resign. Some 11 
months later the Refah party, which still had the most seats in the 
Parliament, was banned after the Constitutional Court ruled the 
party’s religious platform contradicted Turkey’s secular constitution. 
Although the military did not take direct control of the government, 
the ‘28 February process’ was named a post-modern coup. These 
developments, along with the failures of centre-right political parties 
to provide solutions to economic problems and political stability in the 
country paved the way for the emergence of the AKP.
Since 2002 Turkey has been ruled by the conservative AKP, which has its 
roots in political Islam. This has brought about a different environment 
for religious orders, communities and groups because a key element 
in the continuing support for the AKP has been their empowerment 
of conservative Turks, and others who consider themselves to have 
been oppressed or sidelined under previous secular-orientated 
The era of the AKP
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governments. Being religious has become the most important 
qualification to rise through the ranks in Turkish bureaucracy. Most 
of these religious organisations have become very active in politics, 
bureaucracy and the judiciary, replacing secular people. Although 
the majority of these organisations cannot be considered as radical, 
those that could be considered as radical were not seen as a threat 
by the new political environment. The motto of the new government 
was ’no harm could come from the ones praying’. However, this has 
proven to be wrong, and has been recognised by the highest levels 
of government over the last few years. This was particularly the case 
with Fethullah Gülen and his movement, with whom the AKP had a 
close partnership until 2013. Yet the government’s miscalculation 
went even further. Many ultra-conservative and Islamist groups could 
freely work, raise funds, promote their ideology, and organise legal 
and illegal education channels for the indoctrination of many young 
people. As recognised by the government, some of these groups now 
represent a major threat to Turkey.5
Nevertheless, despite the AKP government and the major changes in 
the country during the last 14 years, NATO member Turkey continues 
to be considered as an un-Islamic Western country by homegrown 
and international jihadists groups. In terms of the international 
dimension, the 2003 Istanbul bombings by Al-Qaida, which targeted 
two synagogues, a HSBC Bank and the British Consulate, was the 
first big attack. Although similar terror attacks were carried out by 
the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) - an armed terrorist organisation, 
listed as such by the US and the EU, there were no terror attacks on 
this scale by jihadist radical organisations until ISIS began to target 
Turkey. Turkey’s fight with ISIS in Syria has made the country one of 
the main targets of this terrorist group through their international 
network as well as its Turkish members and sympathisers.
Nevertheless, despite the AKP government and the major changes  
in the country during the last 14 years, NATO member Turkey continues 
to be considered as an un-Islamic Western country by homegrown  
and international jihadists groups.
4  See Mehmet Ali Birand, Son Darbe: 28 Subat, Dogan Kitap, 2012.
5  Hurriyet Daily News, “’Keep away from politics’, Diyanet Tells Religious Groups”, 14 September 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/keep-away-from-politics-diyanet-tells-religious-groups.aspx?pageID=238&nid=103883, last accessed: 12 January 2017.
This approach drastically shifted after the Arab Spring. This was 
reflected by Ankara’s unyielding and disproportionate support for the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammad Morsi in Egypt, as well as Turkey’s 
hardline position regarding Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
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Poorly thought out foreign policy choices have played a key role in 
Turkey’s deteriorating security environment and the increased 
threat from jihadists. 
During the AKP’s rule foreign policy has undergone significant 
changes. Until his resignation as prime minister in May 2016, Ahmet 
Davutogğlu was the most influential foreign policy actor in decades. The 
AKP’s foreign policy was based on Davutoglu’s book Strategic Depth6, 
which argues that because of the historical legacy of the Ottoman 
Empire, Turkey should exercise influence in all these regions and be 
considered as one of the central powers. It was a neo-Ottoman 
vision that saw Turkey as the potential leader of the Muslim world. 
This approach was accepted by the AKP without question. This led to 
the ‘zero problems with neighbours’ policy, and between 2007 and 
2009 Turkey became a significant soft power actor in the Middle East, 
a region which had been ignored for years. Political and economic 
ties were strengthened, including with Syria, which became Ankara’s 
biggest success story. A strong personal relationship developed 
between the Al-Assad and Erdogan families.
Yet, this approach drastically shifted after the Arab Spring. This 
was reflected by Ankara’s unyielding and disproportionate support 
for the Muslim Brotherhood and Mohammad Morsi in Egypt, as well 
as Turkey’s hardline position regarding Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad. The AKP was the loudest and most consistent voice stating 
that there was no room for Assad in any shape or form in Syria’s 
future and the most ardent backer of a number of Syrian militant 
opposition groups under the Free Syrian Army (FSA) umbrella – some 
of them linked to radical groups. While Turkey’s policy shift against 
Damascus seems to have been driven by ideological considerations, 
it also suggests that Turkish leaders believed that the Syrian regime 
would soon fall, just like the Libyan regime. At the time, Davutoglu said 
that the fall of Syria’s government is “only a matter of time”.7 This 
turned out to be ill-considered, ignoring the realities on the ground, 
New “Turkey”, the Syrian civil war and neo-Ottomanism
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with the Assad regime remaining in power until this day thanks to the 
steadfast support of Moscow and Tehran.
Turkey made a number of other serious miscalculations in its Syria 
policy, not least the open and relaxed border policy which Ankara 
adopted between 2011 and 2014. There was a visa-free regime 
between Turkey and Syria before the Syrian Civil War. The country 
kept the border open at the beginning of the war for refugees and 
the opposition groups it supported. This made it very easy for foreign 
fighters, extremists, materials and cash to flow across the Turkish 
border into ISIS-held territories and vice-versa. Even after it was 
closed it remained dangerously porous for months. This was also the 
main route taken by foreign fighters from the EU member states.
However, the flow of fighters is not purely Turkey’s fault. EU member 
states have ignored the issue for a long time. There had been a 
very low level of coordination between Turkey and the EU on this 
issue until the ISIS attacks in Paris in November 2015. Cooperation 
mechanisms were established between Turkey and the EU following 
these attacks but it remains far below the optimal level. According 
to Turkey’s ministry of interior, so far more than 52,000 people from 
145 countries, including EU member states, have been banned from 
entering Turkey, while more than 4,000 people from 98 countries, 
including EU states, have been deported.8
The emergence of ISIS in the Iraq and Syria was not viewed as an 
immediate threat to Turkey, despite ISIS taking the Turkish Consul 
in Mosul and more than 45 members of his staff hostage in June 
2014. Ankara’s first priority was Assad, then the Syrian Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed People’s Protection 
Units (YPG) – the sister organisations of the terrorist PKK, which were 
seen as a serious threat following its expansion in the north of Syria.
6  Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2001, 206-208.
7  Hurriyet Daily News, “Damascus’ fall matter of time, says Davutoglu”, 20 December 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
damascus-fall-matter-of-time-says-davutoglu.aspx?pageID=238&nID=37239&NewsCatID=338, last accessed: 12 January 2017.
8  Statement by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Turkey on 28 December 2016, http://www.haberturk.com/
gundem/haber/1342111-2016da-deasla-irtibatli-bin-313-kisi-tutuklandi, last accessed: 12 January 2017.
While Turkey closed its 822km long border with Syria and is currently 
finalising the construction of a wall, many ISIS operatives are already 
in Turkey. The Turkish authorities estimate the existence of hundreds 
of sleeper cells and 3,000 people linked to the jihadists.11 Online 
propaganda and websites, including ISIS supported websites and 
social media accounts, were also quite accessible until March 2015 
when an Istanbul court ordered the closure of Takva Haber, Turkey’s 
leading ISIS website. However, ISIS continues to be very active online 
through thousands of social media accounts.
In 2016 alone some 1,300 people were arrested in Turkey because 
of their connections with ISIS. Moreover, according to a survey by 
pollster Metropoll in September 2015, 1.6% of Turks were sympathetic 
to ISIS.12 Another survey by PEW, taken in November 2015, showed 
that 8% of Turks were favourable to ISIS.13 This is mostly linked to the 
discourse of the political elite and media, and how the developments 
in Syria were presented. Still, it is difficult to come to the conclusion 
that there is deep-rooted support for ISIS in Turkey.
In terms of the perception of ISIS, much has changed as a result of a 
major shift in Turkey’s Syria policy, ISIS attacks in 2016 and Turkey’s 
military intervention in Syria. However, these figures should still be taken 
Draining the ISIS swamp
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Even when Turkey started to consider ISIS dangerous, it was merely 
viewed as a security threat while PKK/PYD was seen as an existential 
threat to the country’s security. Turkey’s military intervention in Syria 
should also be considered in this sense; it is directly against ISIS but 
indirectly against PYD to prevent the latter from controlling the whole 
of northern Syria. That said, the operation has successfully cleared 
ISIS from the Turkey-Syria border, creating a de facto buffer zone. 
ISIS can no longer use this border to smuggle in foreign fighters and 
logistical needs, and is looking elsewhere9. Moreover, Turkey also killed 
some 1,500 ISIS members in Syria in less than five months.10
The emergence of ISIS in the Iraq and Syria was not viewed  
as an immediate threat to Turkey, despite ISIS taking the Turkish 
Consul in Mosul and more than 45 members of his staff hostage  
in June 2014.
63
9  Janes Intelligence Weekly, “Islamic State adapting to loss of road access to Turkish border by drawing on co-operation 
from Jund al-Aqsa”, 10 October 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/64480/islamic-state-adapting-to-loss-of-road-access-
to-turkish-border-by-drawing-on-co-operation-from-jund-al-aqsa, last accessed: 12 January 2017.
10  DW Turkish, “TSK: Toplam bin 518 IS˛l˙D’li öldürüldü”, 14 January 2017, http://www.dw.com/tr/tsk-toplam-bin-518-
is˛idli-öldürüldü/a-37132010, last accessed: 15 January 2017.
11  “3,000 in Turkey linked to ISIL group, police intel report says”, Hurriyet Daily News, 17 January 2015, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/3000-in-turkey-linked-to-isil-group-police-intel-report-says.aspx?pageID=238&nID=77063&NewsCatID=341, last accessed: 
14 January 2017.
12  Metropoll, “Türkiye'nin Nabzı Eylül 2015”, Istanbul, October 2015.
13  Pew Research Centre, “In nations with significant Muslim populations, much disdain for ISIS”, 17 November 2015, http://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/, 
last accessed: 13 January 2017
14  Stein, Aaron (2016), “Islamic States network in Turkey: recruitment for the caliphate”, Atlantic Council, http://www.publications.
atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Islamic-State-Networks-in-Turkey-web-1003.pdf, last accessed: 14 January 2017.
15  Stein Aaron (2016), “Islamic States network in Turkey: recruitment for the caliphate”, Atlantic Council, http://www.publications.
atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Islamic-State-Networks-in-Turkey-web-1003.pdf, last accessed: 14 January 2017.
very seriously in terms of the numbers of radicals in the country and 
the potential for that number to increase even further. Radicalisation 
in Turkey did not start with the Syrian Civil War. It was an issue that 
has been largely ignored for many years. Yet developments in Syria 
facilitated the radicalisation process and created an international 
network of radicals, as well as a cause to fight for. According to recent 
report by expert Aaron Stein, “many of the key Turkey-based ISIS 
recruiters have links to the Afghan Jihads (1979 to 1989 and 2001 to 
present). They are well-known in their communities, often with links to 
small religious groups, and have created an interconnected network.”14 
Personalised recruitment networks (families, co-workers, and friends) 
along with informal group sessions in local mosques have also proven 
to be very successful in pulling recruits into jihadist groups.15
Furthermore, the foreign fighter issue is not a new phenomenon 
either. Hundreds of Turks fought in the Karabakh, Bosnia, the Northern 
Caucasus wars, as well as against the Soviets in Afghanistan. They went 
to fight for a variety of reasons including religious or ethnic loyalties. 
However, their numbers were limited compared to the number of 
Turkish ISIS fighters, and they were more focused on a local conflict, 
without having a global vision. ISIS changed the dynamic of jihadist 
radicalisation by creating an international network, a de facto state-
like entity, professional communication and a propaganda strategy, 
and a well-structured recruitment mechanism. A study carried out by 
the Institute for Strategic Dialogue writes that “logistically it was very 
easy for Turks to travel to Syria, which accounts for the fact that Turkey 
is the fourth highest contributor of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq – 
While specific programmes are urgently required, at the same time, 
getting the country back on a democratic track in terms of secularism, 
democratic values, pluralism and a Western education system seems 
to be the only long-term solution. Religious freedoms should be 
guaranteed but this should not mean tolerating radical religious groups 
and their activities. Radical, Islamist and ultra-conservative religious 
groups and their common ideology, which poisons social coherence 
and indoctrinates young people, must be taken very seriously.
The way ahead
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behind Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Russia.”16 However, in terms of per 
capita foreign fighters, Turkey is far behind many countries, including 
some EU countries.
The number of ISIS sympathisers is a warning sign for the future. While 
ISIS will lose in Syria, radical groups and their ideology will remain strong. 
ISIS skillfully uses its powerful religious ideology to convince would-be 
recruits to join the group for terrorist activities. Social media has been 
at the core of this process. It has been very skillfully used to reinforce 
the description of ISIS as a so-called movement devoted to protecting 
Muslims and to fighting an unfair global system. This will not disappear 
simply because the group has been defeated militarily. This means the 
security threat from ISIS in Turkey and elsewhere will remain. Turkey 
needs a long-term strategy to counter these groups and individuals 
and to prevent the radicalisation of new people. Presently Turkey has 
two main programmes aimed at countering violent extremism: an 
outreach programme coordinated by the police, which aims to prevent 
radicalisation in vulnerable communities, and a special programme 
under the Diyanet focused on countering jihadist messaging. This is 
done predominantly by the publication of sermons and reports that 
undermine ISIS’ messaging and credibility but has only had limited 
impact.17 For example one of the reasons sermons in mosques have 
not been particularly successful is because mosques are not the main 
recruiting ground of those targeting potential jihadists. The Diyanet 
should increasingly reach out through other channels.
While ISIS will lose in Syria, radical groups and their ideology will remain 
strong. ISIS skillfully uses its powerful religious ideology to convince 
would-be recruits to join the group for terrorist activities.
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The issue of radicalisation should not only be seen from a security 
perspective. This cannot be solved by simply implementing anti-terror 
measures that disrupt and destroy networks. Comprehensive and 
nuanced de-radicalisation and counter-terrorism strategies should be 
developed by addressing the root causes of the issue and the ideology 
behind radicalisation.
There should be a comprehensive strategy against online radicalisation 
and online propaganda of radical groups. While a domestic strategy is 
needed, it needs to be rooted within regional and global approaches to 
be effective. Counter-narrative strategies should also be developed. It 
is one of the priorities at EU level, but Turkey has not been discussing the 
importance of a counter-narrative in a comprehensive and structured 
way yet. This can be an important element for further cooperation with 
the EU, especially considering the number of Turkish-speaking people 
in the EU.
Furthermore, to make such strategies effective there needs to be more 
interdepartmental data sharing. For example, between the relevant 
ministries, the police and the intelligence service, the MIT.
Other steps could include:
❯  the empowerment of civil society and role models to play an 
active role in counter-extremism efforts;
❯  prevention of hate speech and discourses targeting the plurality 
of society (in this respect EU legislation could be a good model);
❯  prevention of illegal and unofficial educational activities of 
religious orders or other religious groups;
❯  identification and prevention of foreign funding channels that 
finance violent and non-violent radical organisations;
❯  reflection on the current policing policy and other measures in 
areas that have become particular hotbeds of radicalisation;
❯  development of prevention and de-radicalisation programmes to 
counter violent extremism by looking at best practices from other 
countries, including models from the UK, Denmark and Sweden 
which have developed effective approaches and policies;
16  Institute for Strategic Dialogue, “ISIS and Nusra in Turkey: Jihasist recruitment and Ankara’s reponse, How May Turkish jihadists 
are active?” 2016, pp. 7.
17  US State Department, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015”, Turkey, June 2016, pp. 159, https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/258249.pdf, last accessed: 13 January 2017.
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Closer cooperation mechanisms between the EU and Turkey and other 
like-minded countries must be further developed and established in 
order to prevent short-term security challenges, like foreign fighters, 
as well as long-term dangers.
❯  taking non-violent radical organisations sharing the same ideology 
and messages seriously;
❯  strengthening secularism as an element to ensure plurality in the 
society as well as fundamental rights and freedoms, including 
the freedom of belief;
❯  and lastly, promoting democratic values to maintain civil liberties, 
not only for religious groups but for everyone including minority 
groups, non-believers and seculars.
Jihadi radicalisation is an international threat, which requires an 
international response. It is positive that the EU and Turkey have 
recognised the importance of the need to work closely together to counter 
these threats by strengthening cooperation on information sharing, law 
enforcement and judicial cooperation, including cooperation in the field 
of terrorism-related deportations and the financing of terrorism. Closer 
cooperation mechanisms between the EU and Turkey and other like-
minded countries must be further developed and established in order 
to prevent short-term security challenges, like foreign fighters, as well as 
long-term dangers
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The winds of change in the Middle East reignited the debate about 
whether the new political sphere could allow non-democratic players 
to use democratic means to establish non-democratic regimes; and 
whether it will moderate the views and/or actions of Islamist groups, 
particularly those with radical/Jihadi tendencies, and push them to 
participate in the political process. The inclusion-moderation thesis 
postulates that in order for an Islamist group to compete in and win 
elections, it would need to appeal to a wider voter-base than their 
own, which could help bring them closer to the centre. However, 
the theory does not provide adequate hypothesis regarding the 
inclusion of groups that reject the ballot box together with other 
democratisation tools.
In addition, proponents of political Islam often argued that political 
empowerment of moderate Islamists who emphasise non-violence 
and democracy can create a ‘firewall’ against violent extremism.1 This 
is presumably true when extremist groups are brought into the political 
process to help moderate them behaviorally and ideologically2. This 
article aims to revisit the inclusion-moderation thesis. It examines the 
impact of moderate Islamists’ policy of inclusion towards radical and 
ultraconservative Islamists. It also explores the causes underpinning 
the failure of the Islamists in power to stop or reverse radicalisation in 
Egypt and Tunisia.
1  “House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2016), “’Political Islam’, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”, UK: Sixth 
Report of Session 2016–17, available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/118/118.pdf.
2  Brocker, Manfred; Künkler, Mirjam (2013), "Religious parties: Revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis1-Introduction", 
Party Politics, 19.2. pp. 171-186.
The term ‘Islamist’ refers to various groups across the spectrum of 
Salafism which seek economic, political and social reforms through the 
application of Islamic Law (Sharia). Salafism is an all-encompassing 
concept that brings together “faith, law, rites, moral and ethical codes 
of conduct and ideals to political order”3. It is important to distinguish 
three strands within Salafism. First, puritan Salafism is an apolitical 
doctrine that focuses on religious education through Da’wa4. Second, 
political Salafism involves working within the system to achieve the 
desired change in order to ensure that the legal system is fully Sharia 
compliant. Third, Jihadist Salafism involves violence and subversion5. 
While they differ in modus operandi, the three strands share a strict 
interpretation of Islam drawn from the Quran, Sunna (Prophetic 
traditions) and the actions of the Early Muslims al-Salaf al-Saleh6.
In this context, moderation occurs as a result of moving on a continuum 
from radical to moderate or away from more exclusionary worldviews7. 
According to Samuel Huntington, this process is called ‘participation-
moderation’8 (1993), where groups who have been previously politically 
excluded become eligible to benefit from a political opening and 
accordingly they should modify “their demands and moderate their 
tactics”9. The main assumption underpinning the inclusion-moderation 
thesis is that Islamist actors should accept formal political, social and 
economic institutions; renounce violence; take part in elections; and 
operate through parliamentary arrangements10. This acceptance would 
entail moderation as a pragmatic way to appeal to a broader audience, 
which leads to more influence and power. In an inclusive environment, 
opportunity to mobilise supporters and debate controversial issues in 
public exist for all.
In theory, inclusion should push Islamist actors towards moderation. 
In practice, it could lead to a phenomenon called ‘the paradox of 
democracy’. This is defined as:
“[T]he idea that democratic processes might empower non-
democratic actors to reverse those openings and perhaps 
permanently. Acting as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a group may 
present itself as committed to democratic process only to abandon 
that stance once it gained enough power democratically to overturn 
the democratic system entirely, or at least alter the process.”11
Acceptance would entail moderation as a pragmatic way to appeal  
to a broader audience, which leads to more influence and power.  
In an inclusive environment, opportunity to mobilise supporters and 
debate controversial issues in public exist for all.
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Moderation in this sense is behavioural rather than ideological. If 
a group adopts a rigid worldview, can mere inclusion allow for its 
ideological moderation? Or at least help them accept that the views 
of others may be more viable than their own? From a behavioural 
standpoint, moderate Islamists have been or become moderate prior 
to their inclusion. For example, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) renounced violence after they were imprisoned during the rule 
of former Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the 1960s, 
MB members who continued to embrace Jihad branched off and 
created militant organisations. Meanwhile, the mother organisation 
capitalised on an opening provided thereafter by President Anwar 
Sadat, who came to office following the death of Nasser in 1970 
to build its grassroots base through charity and socio-economic 
activities. Another opening for political inclusion was provided under 
President Hosni Mubarak’s regime by allowing MB to run in the 
1987, 2005 and 2010 parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, Tunisia’s 
Ennahda started in the 1970s as an anti-democratic movement with 
a tawhid-based (principle of unity) perspective of politics and society, 
resolving to impose Shari’a to win at the ballot box. By the late 1980s, 
Ennahda had shifted its position to accept democratic tools.12
Furthermore, inclusion as a mechanism to support moderate actors 
is presumably aimed at depriving radicals of their base of support by 
making available a moderate alternative that operates within the 
system and by the accepted rules of the game. In Tunisia and Egypt, this 
approach did not have much impact on reducing the appeal of radical 
Islamism. In Tunisia, MB’s pragmatism in agreeing to enact a constitution 
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3  Said, Behnam T; Fouad, Hazim (2014), “Einleitung”, in: idem (eds.): Salafismus. Auf der Suche nach dem wahren Islam, 
Freiburg i. Br., pp. 23–51, pp. 30.
4  Da’wa “expresses the sense of ‘call’ or ‘invitation’. It comes from the verb da’a, ‘to call’”. For full definition and 
explanation, see Kerr, David A. (2000), “ISLAMICDA ’WAAND CHRISTIAN MISSION: TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS”, 
International Review of Mission, 89:353, pp.150–171.
5  Volks, Thomas (2015), “Islam-Islamism: Clarification for Turbulant Times”, Facts and Findings, Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, 
pp. 164, available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_40120-544-2-30.pdf?150219152955.
6  Ratka, Edmund; Roux, Marie-Christine (2016), “Jihad instead of democracy? Tunisia’s Marginalised youth and Islamist 
terrorism”, Globalisation of Terrorism, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
7  Schwedler, Jillian (2013), “Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation, and the Arab Uprisings”, Middle East Development 
Journal, 5:1, pp.1350006–1–1350006–18.
8  Huntigton, Samuel (1993), The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press. pp. 165 - 170.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid.
11  Schwedler, “Islamists in power? Inclusion, moderation, and the Arab uprisings”, 2011.
12  Cavatorta, Francesco; Merone, Fabio (2013), “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from 
Fundamentalist to Conservative Party.” Democratization, 20 (5), pp. 857–875.
Although the birthplace of the Arab Spring, Tunisia quickly transformed 
into fertile soil for breeding terrorism. After the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, 
the troika government (led by Ennahda13) adopted an ‘engagement and 
dialogue’ approach towards the Salafist community whose presence 
was visible in politics, violent extremism and vigilantism.14 The majority 
of Salafists belong to scientific (educational) Salafism, which focuses 
primarily on Da’wa and charity work. Since the early days of post-
revolution Tunisia, the Jihadi Salafist movement of Ansar al-Sharia 
in Tunisia (AST) started to gain traction and had become responsible 
for the recruitment of many of the 5500 Tunisians to terrorism.15 
Meanwhile, small-sized Salafist groups formed vigilante committees to 
enforce Sharia law in the streets of Tunisia16.
Ennahda did nothing to stop the rapid spread of radical Islam and 
violent extremism in the country. The party was occupied with political 
bargaining to secure power. This left a vacuum in the religious 
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that does not mention that Sharia is the source of the law was widely 
perceived by the ultraconservative and Jihadi Salafists as a setback 
and the MB were viewed as traitors to the Islamic project. In Egypt, 
MB found themselves in competition with strong Salafist parties and 
movements, which ultimately pushed them to adopt further far-right 
positions, particularly on Sharia, in the 2012 Constitution. Radical groups 
that already have large support bases did not see moderation as a go-
to alternative. Since 2012, both countries have continued to suffer from 
one of the worst waves of violent extremism.
In Egypt and Tunisia, the inclusion-moderation thesis did not hold water 
during the Islamist rule. The emergence of radical Islamist movements 
and parties made moderation more difficult. The following sections 
will discuss why radicalisation gained traction under the Islamist rule 
in Egypt and Tunisia.
Since 2012, both countries have continued to suffer from one of the 
worst waves of violent extremism... In Egypt and Tunisia, the inclusion-
moderation thesis did not hold water during the Islamist rule.  
The emergence of radical Islamist movements and parties made 
moderation more difficult.
sphere, which was soon filled by Salafists. Ennahda firmly believed 
that moderation of the Salafists was possible through dialogue and 
political inclusion. Once moderated, the Salafists would join the ranks 
of Ennahda as a better alternative.17 Ennahda also believed that 
repression triggered this radicalism and Salafi violence is nothing 
but an expression of anger due to the rampant structural problems 
endured by Tunisia, including unemployment, poor economic 
conditions, lack of freedoms and marginalisation18.
The scientific Salafists created three ultraconservative political parties: 
Hizb al-Asalah (Authenticity Party), Jabhat al-Islah (Reform Front) and Hisb 
al-Rahma (the Mercy Party) to compete in the elections. The legalisation 
of the Salafist parties was only possible under the Ennahda-led 
government. The Reform Front had applied for registration at the 
Ministry of Interior under the transitional government of Sidi Essebsi. 
The application was turned down on the grounds that its bylaws were 
inconsistent with the law. Upon the election of Ennahda, the law was 
amended allowing for the registration of the Reform Front with its 
bylaws unchanged.19 Ennahda believed that marginalisation would 
only result in radicalisation.20
The legalisation of the Salafi parties was received favourably with 
the view that their moderation could offset the growing radicalisation 
in Tunisia.21 A key motivation to establish political parties was the 
Salafi frustration with Ennahda’s compromise on Sharia. Despite their 
efforts, they could not as of yet secure any seats in the Parliament. 
The Salafist turnout in the elections was meagre, which reflected a 
genuine disinterest among the Salafist constituencies in the newly 
found democratic opening.22
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Progress, Working Paper.
15  Ibid.
16  Ratka and Roux, “Jihad instead of democracy? Tunisia’s Marginalised youth and Islamist terrorism”.
17  Lang et al., “Tunisia’s Struggle For Political Pluralism”.
18  Interview with the Lang et al., authors of the “Tunisia’s Struggle for Political Pluralism After Ennahda” report, Center of 
American Progress, 2014.
19  Wolff, Anne (2014), “The Radicalization of Tunisia’s Mosques”, CTC Sentinel, 7:6, pp. 17–20.
20  Moniquet, Claude (2013), "The involvement of Salafism-Wahhabism in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups 
around the world”, European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs.
21  Reichinnek, Heidi (2015), “Salafismus und Jihadismus in Tunesien”, MENA direkt. Islamismus in Bewegung, Marburg: 
Philipps Universität Marburg.
22  Lorch, J. and Ranko, A. (2016), “GIGA focus Middle East”, GIGA Focus Nahost, 07(07), available at: https://www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/publication/salafists-in-the-maghreb-region-political-ambitions-in-the-aftermath-of-the-arab-spring.
Meanwhile a more radical alternative had surfaced, delivering the 
type of discourse that resonated with Salafists and non-Salafist alike. 
In April 2011, Abou Ayad, a Salafi Jihadist formed Ansar al-Sharia 
in Tunisia (AST). Earlier in February, he was released from prison by 
a presidential pardon together with many other high-risk Islamist 
prisoners who were jailed prior to the 14 January 2011 uprising for 
terrorism and money-laundering crimes. Many Tunisian hardliners 
were allowed to return home.23 Later, the returnee Jihadists helped 
establish the Uqba ibn Nafi brigade, the Tunisian branch of al-Qaida 
in Maghreb (AQIM) in the Chaabi Mountain, Kasserine.24
From the onset, AST considered state institutions and man-made laws 
illegitimate. They controlled mosques and carried out propaganda 
activities to ‘educate Tunisians about true Islam’. Taking advantage 
of Ennahda’s tolerance policy, they were allowed to organise rallies 
where Jabhet al-Nusra flags were raised, calling for Jihad. They also 
preached in mosques, performed social activism, particularly in areas 
where the government had no reach.25 They appeared on television to 
defend themselves and to ensure that people “hear from them rather 
than hear about them from others”.26 AST felt that with the current 
lax and accepting climate, transition from preaching to Jihad in 
Tunisia was eminent.
At first, the coalition government did not take any measures to regain 
control over the mosques that AST was using for jihadist recruitment. 
Furthermore, the radical wing of Ennahda not only joined the Salafist 
preachers in surrounding the mosques but also spoke at AST rallies 
in 2011 and 2012.27 In a leaked video of Rashid al-Ghannouchi, the 
Intellectual Leader of Ennahda, he assured two Salafist figures that 
“the mosques are no longer under the control of the Secularists. They 
are in the hands of Islamists. You [Salafists] are free to use mosques, 
build schools, hold your Da’wa rallies and bring preachers from other 
countries because our people are ignorant of Islam.”28
Ennahda also turned a blind eye to Salafi vigilantism and violent 
extremism. Vigilante Salafi groups calling themselves the League 
for the Protection of the Revolution physically assaulted unveiled 
women, artists, NGO activists and club owners. They also protested 
against exhibitions and cinemas29.
Taking advantage of Ennahda’s tolerance policy, they were allowed  
to organise rallies where Jabhet al-Nusra flags were raised, calling  
for Jihad.
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Ennahda always asserted publically, on every possible occasion, that it 
supported diversity and fundamental freedoms. However, reality tells 
a different story. The failure to supress violent extremism is seen by 
its critics as complacency and implicit endorsement. Perpetrators of 
these offenses were not brought to justice. Salafi political party leaders 
and Salafi-linked civil society organisations remained sympathetic 
to the AST project and criticised Ennahda for designating AST a 
terrorist organisation.30 Hopes of Salafi moderation crumbled as 
tensions between Salafist supporters of AST and Ennahda intensified31 
and the government cracked down on AST after a series of political 
assassinations and heinous acts of terror targeting the US Embassy 
and secular politicians. It is noteworthy that Ennahda defended 
its inaction by pointing out that hardliners were released by the 
transitional government and the weakness of the police made violent 
extremism possible.32
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23  Spencer, Robert (2011), “Tunisia’s new government grants general amnesty to imprisoned Islamic supremacists”, Jihad 
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24  Zelin, A. Y; Lebovich, A; Gartenstein-Ross, D (2013), “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisia Strategy” CTC Sentinel, 6(7).
25  Zelin, Aaron Y (2013), "Meeting Tunisia's Ansar al-Sharia", Foreign Policy 8.
26  Rayed, Seif el-Dein (2015), “Former Official Spokesman of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia calls for dialogue with the Salafist 
Youth”, al-Quds al-Arabi, available at: http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=421686
27  Interview with Walid Mejri, Journalist and Editor-in-Chief of Inkyfada in Ratka, and Roux, “Jihad instead of democracy?”
28  Minute 2:50 of the Leaked video available from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m5vqhT8TxRw.
29  Dettmer, Jamie (2013), “Tunisia’s Dark Turn,” The Daily Beast, March 17, available at: http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/03/17/tunisia-s-dark-turn.html.
30  “Dangerous Bedfellows, Ennahda party has declared Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organisation but not all party members 
agree”, Correspondents.org. Available at: http://www.correspondents.org/node/3848.
31  Lang et al. “Tunisia’s Struggle for Political Pluralism After Ennahda”.
32  House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. “Political Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood Review”.
The 2011 revolution opened the political domain for a number of 
diverse Islamist actors to meaningfully participate in shaping Egypt’s 
future. The country’s transition was more dependent on electoral 
arrangements than building legal and constitutional frameworks 
to safeguard fundamental rights and freedoms, irrespective of 
who would come to power. The nature of the transition created a 
competition amongst Islamist groups along the spectrum of Islamism. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) used the 
extremist worldviews held by the Salafi Nour party (the light) to win the 
votes of the undecided Islamist voters. In 2012, Islamists controlled 
approximately 70% of the short-lived parliament; 218 were won by 
FJP, and 111 by the Salafi Nour party. Ultraconservative movements 
were also able to establish and legalise political parties such as the 
Building and Development Party, the political arm of the former 
terrorist group al-Jama’a al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Group).
The rise of the Salafists represented a threat to the MB’s position 
among its far-right constituency. However, on the flipside, MB believed 
that by allowing radical Islamist discourse it could help bolster its 
appeal as pragmatic and moderate in comparison.33 The MB and 
Salafist parties enjoyed a complicated relationship. Initially, the MB 
accused the Salafist Call Da’wa Salafiyah, the preaching organisation to 
which the Al Nour party is affiliated, that the Mubarak regime used 
them to undermine MB’s outreach and influence, while al-Da’wa Salafiyah 
accused the MB of prioritising pragmatism and political interests over 
the Islamic creed. Thereafter, they teamed up as a united Islamic front 
to ensure the Islamist domination of the Constituent Assembly. Finally 
this partnership of convenience ended with the Nour party siding with 
the secularists to remove Mohammed Morsi from power.
In 2011 and 2012, jihadism was reborn in the Sinai. More than 15 
Jihadi organisations including al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Ansar Bayt al-
Maqdis (ABM), Shoura Council of the Mujahideen of Jerusalem, Salah 
In 2011 and 2012, jihadism was reborn in the Sinai. More than 15 
Jihadi organisations including al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis 
(ABM), Shoura Council of the Mujahideen of Jerusalem, Salah el-Din 
Brigades and Ansar al-Shari’a amongst others34  
were created.
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el-Din Brigades and Ansar al-Shari’a amongst others34 were created. 
Immediately after Morsi released the former leaders of the terrorist 
group the Vanguard of the Conquest Tala’e’ al-Fat’h, Ahmed Ashush 
and Mohamed al-Zawahiri, brother of al-Qaida leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri, from prison, both began to rebuild Jihadi organisations 
in Sinai. Seizing the opportunities offered by an Islamist president, 
security gaps and political tolerance or indifference, they recruited 
thousands of unaffiliated Salafists to form the Jihadi Vanguard 
Salafism or al-Tali’a al-Salafiyyah group, whose goal is “to support Islam 
and establish a rational Islamic Caliphate… [U]sing all available and 
legitimate means… [including] Qur’an and a sword”35. Meanwhile, 
ABM managed to set up small cells along the Nile Valley tasked with 
intelligence gathering to prepare for imminent Jihad.36
Morsi was keen to avoid antagonising any of the Islamist groups, 
including al-Qaida or anyone else.37 Pressured by the Salafists, the 
only group whom Morsi was prepared to suppress was the Shia sect. 
Extremist Salafists were given significant leeway to incite online and 
offline against the Shia. This was further facilitated by the anti-Shia 
campaign spearheaded by the Salafi Call, the Muslim Brotherhood 
and al-Azhar in reaction to Morsi’s intention to allow Iranian tourists 
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anti-Shia campaign spearheaded by the Salafi Call, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and al-Azhar in reaction to Morsi’s intention to allow 
Iranian tourists into Egypt.
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into Egypt. Four Shia were lynched by an angry Islamist mob in 
Zawyet Abou Mosalem, Giza. Other sectarian attacks were conducted 
and the perpetrators were not held accountable.38
In the early days following the 2011 revolution, an unidentified militant 
group carried out four attacks against Israel, including attacking 
natural gas pipelines. A year later, a video statement by the group 
revealed that the attacks were part of Jihad against Israel for “giving 
gas to our enemies for free”.39 This rhetoric gained momentum as the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Secretary-General Mahmoud Hysayn implied 
that Morsi’s diplomatic approach towards Israel was not necessarily 
shared by the MB organisation. He then affirmed that the “Hamas 
movement is considered part of the Muslim Brotherhood”.40 A similar 
statement was articulated by the MB’s Supreme Guide, Mohammed 
Badi, who affirmed that it is the duty of “every Muslim to strive to 
save Jerusalem from the hands of the rapists”.41
The Jihadi public discourse began to intensify at the national level 
as the Syrian conflict unfolded. Framed as a war of Shia against 
Sunnis, hundreds of Salafi controlled mosques demanded Morsi to 
“authorise Jihad”. Thousands of Islamists took to the streets to voice 
their support for the ‘holy war against the Syrian regime’. One of 
Morsi’s presidential advisors stated that Egyptians are free to travel 
[to Syria] if they wanted to without officially endorsing jihad.42 Internal 
and external pressures on Morsi heightened to “open the door for 
Jihad in Syria”. On 15 June 2013, Morsi attended the Conference to 
Support the Syrian Revolution in Cairo Stadium, where two Salafist 
sheikhs called for Jihad in Syria. Observers believe that Morsi’s 
attendance and speech were perceived as an endorsement of the 
call for Jihad and a maneuver to win the Jihadists over to stand by 
his side against the 30 June 2013 anti-Morsi protests, when millions 
of demonstrators across Egypt lined the streets to demand the 
president's removal on the first anniversary of his inauguration.
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The Jihadi public discourse began to intensify at the national level as 
the Syrian conflict unfolded. Framed as a war of Shia against Sunnis, 
hundreds of Salafi controlled mosques demanded Morsi to “authorise 
Jihad”. Thousands of Islamists took to the streets to voice their support 
for the ‘holy war against the Syrian regime’.
The cases of Egypt and Tunisia demonstrate that radicalisation is 
more likely to occur under inclusion than repression. The concept of 
inclusion-moderation becomes less relevant when ultraconservative 
Islamists are added to the political equation.43 Rather, Salafists 
appear to have pushed the moderate Islamists to be less moderate. 
As a result, more radical groups may be encouraged to test the 
new limits by pushing them even further to the far-right so that it 
becomes a vicious circle. In particular, moderate Islamists operating 
in a political context whose rules are yet to be written are likely to be 
pushed towards radicalism, especially if Salafists emerge as a strong 
contender in electoral races or if more radical groups have large 
audiences. By analogy, secularists may also feel pressured to move 
to a more religiously conservative centre.
It is important to note that elections are an appropriate tool to 
settle political differences in democratically stable countries.44 In 
transitional contexts, priority should be assigned to the development 
of constitutional and legal framework through an inclusive consensus-
based process.45 It will ensure that no single organisation, political party 
or institution has a monopoly over deciding the course of transition. Only 
with well-established rule of law, an independent judiciary, and impartial 
state institutions, can inclusion yield non-reversible moderation
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Rupert Sutton, Director of Student Rights, the Henry Jackson Society
Challenging vulnerability to radicalisation in Europe’s 
education sectors:
LESSONS FROM BRITISH CVE EXPERIENCES
In recent months, the potential threat posed to Europe by terrorist plots 
utilising attackers young enough to be in full-time education has been 
demonstrated by arrests across Belgium, France and Germany.1 With 
many of those held believed to have been in contact with European-
born Islamic State recruiters based in Syria,2 it is clear that European 
law enforcement agencies still face a significant challenge despite the 
numbers travelling to Syria falling.3 Understanding and countering the 
Islamism-inspired radicalisation of young people therefore remains a 
crucial policy challenge across the EU, and one where sharing past 
experiences and best practice will be vital.
In the United Kingdom (UK), the government has long-recognised that the 
school and higher education sectors are ones in which young people can 
be given the skills required to increase their resilience to radicalisation. 
However, there has also been a significant number of individuals 
convicted of terrorism offences, or who have travelled overseas to join 
militant groups, who were enrolled in full-time education at the time, 
suggesting that opportunities to intervene may have been missed. It can 
also be argued that the environment of educational institutions may be 
particularly conducive to many of the engagement factors which can 
draw people into involvement with extremist groups, causes or ideologies.
Since the revision of the Prevent strategy in 2011, the British government 
has continued to refine how counter-radicalisation efforts operate in 
schools, colleges and universities, and developed a number of legal 
and regulatory structures and requirements as part of this process. 
The response to this from extremist groups, public sector activists, and 
institutions has been instructive, and should provide other EU member 
states developing or refining programmes aimed at countering violent 
extremism (CVE) with lessons for the future.
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Introduction
The UK’s education sector has long been recognised by the 
government as one that is vulnerable to extremist misuse, and where 
individuals may be at risk of radicalisation. In 2011, the new coalition 
government review of the Prevent strategy declared that the purpose 
of Prevent was in part to “prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism”, working “with sectors and institutions where there are 
risks of radicalisation”.4
The strategy identified that, while there was “no systematic attempt 
to recruit or radicalise people in full-time education”, a number of 
terrorist plots had involved individuals who had become involved with 
violent extremism while at school. It also highlighted that a significant 
number of referrals to Channel, the government’s programme to 
identify and support individuals at risk of being drawn into terrorism, 
were aged between 15 and 19 years old. The Prevent review also 
addressed the higher education sector, concluding that there was 
“unambiguous evidence to indicate that some extremist organisations 
[…] target specific universities and colleges (notably those with a large 
number of Muslim students) with the objective of radicalising and 
recruiting students”.5
Following these findings, the report of the Task Force on Tackling 
Radicalisation and Extremism set up in the wake of the murder of 
Lee Rigby by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale concluded in 
December 2013 that more oversight was needed in some schools. It 
also highlighted that “[e]xtremist preachers use some higher education 
[sic] institutions as a platform for spreading their messages”.6 This 
echoed the views of Charles Farr, then-Director General of the Home 
Office’s Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), who had 
told a parliamentary committee in November 2011 that extremists 
who stood “against core UK values and whose ideology incidentally 
is also shared by terrorist organisations” were able to address 
students regularly, and without challenge, at UK universities.7
In October 2015, the new Conservative government published a 
counter-extremism strategy, which it declared would guide the British 
state’s response to all forms of extremism. When focusing on the 
education sector, the strategy highlighted that, within higher education, 
“students are and have been influenced by extremist ideology and…
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some universities have been the focus of attention by extremist 
speakers”. It also highlighted the risk posed to the small number of 
students studying in schools which extremists had attempted to gain 
control of, and by the lack of regulation of some supplementary schools 
and tuition centres outside of government control.8
The risk of radicalisation facing individuals within the UK’s education 
sector has also been demonstrated by the number of students enrolled 
in full-time education who have been convicted of Islamism-inspired, 
terrorism-related offences, or travelled overseas to join militant groups 
in recent years. Research from the Henry Jackson Society published 
in January 2017 found that 33 individuals convicted of committing an 
Islamism-inspired terrorism offence between 1998 and 2015 (12.3% of 
the total) were enrolled as students at the time of their arrest.9
In April 2016, King’s College London (KCL) student, Suhaib Majeed, 
was sentenced to life in prison for conspiracy to murder after planning 
an Islamic State-inspired shooting in London.10 Other recent offenders 
have included:
❯  Cuybeda Jama, a student at Middlesex University arrested as 
he attempted to travel to Syria to join Islamic State (IS), and 
sentenced to three and half years in prison in July 2016;
❯  Yahya Rashid, who used a forged educational certificate to 
fraudulently gain a place at Middlesex University, and received 
a five-year prison sentence in November 2015 for using his 
student loan to fund travel to Syria;
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❯  Afsana Kayum, a law student at the University of East London 
(UEL) who was given an eighteen-month sentence in March 
2015 for possession of a record containing information useful in 
the commission of terrorism; and
❯  David Souaan, a Birkbeck student convicted of preparing for 
terrorist attacks in Syria and sentenced to three and a half years 
in prison in February 2015.11
Outside of higher education, in July 2015 a 15 year-old boy anonymised 
as ‘Boy X’ and attending a secondary school for pupils with behavioural 
issues was convicted of using the encrypted messaging app Telegram 
to incite a man based in Australia to attack a police officer during an 
Anzac Day parade in Melbourne. The boy was also in contact with 
a 16 year-old secondary school pupil from Manchester anonymised 
as ‘Girl Y’, who was convicted of possession of a record containing 
information useful in the commission of terrorism in August 2015.12
Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, a number of students at 
schools, colleges and universities have also travelled to the country to 
either work with/fight alongside extremist groups, with several having 
been killed in action during such activities. The most well-known are 
likely to be three school-girls who travelled from Bethnal Green in 
East London in February 2015,13 but there have been dozens of 
others, including two clusters of students from Coventry and Liverpool 
who travelled to fight for IS in 2014 and 2013 respectively.14
While the evidence is clear that individuals enrolled in full-time 
education in the UK are vulnerable to being drawn into violent 
extremism, the unique nature of each person’s radicalisation process 
makes it very difficult to come to any wider conclusions about the 
factors involved.
In the UK, the government has identified a broad process by which 
it believes vulnerable people can become involved in terrorism, with 
a person first engaging with a cause or ideology in the absence 
of protective factors before developing the intent and capability 
to commit harm. The British government’s Channel Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework, released in October 2012 and used to 
evaluate whether support is required for individuals referred to the 
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programme, lays out a number of the engagement factors that might 
lead individuals to be more at risk of engaging with an extreme group, 
cause, or ideology.15 Including personal susceptibilities and motivations 
alongside individual circumstances and outside influences, many of 
the factors, while not specific to students, can be found at the heart of 
the student experience in school, college or university environments, 
suggesting that the education sector provides fertile grounds for 
these factors to take hold.
For new students in higher or further education, many of whom will 
have travelled away from home and the protective factors provided 
by family and peer networks, the move to university or college is one 
of the most significant transitional periods they will ever go through in 
their life. The Channel guidance highlights how “being at a transitional 
time of life” can be a specific engagement factor into involvement with 
a cause or group, and it is possible that the educational environment 
may also provide the impetus for the development of other 
engagement factors. These could include “a need for identity, meaning 
and belonging” or “a desire for status” following such a move, as well 
as “a desire for excitement and adventure” driven by the loneliness 
that many new students experience. In turn, these factors may leave 
students vulnerable to “being influenced or controlled by a group” or 
drive “opportunistic involvement” with extremist organisations.16
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in-Syria.html, last accessed on: 22 December 2016.
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After David Souaan was jailed in February 2015, it was highlighted 
that he had been particularly vulnerable to radicalisation after he left 
home in Serbia to attend university in London. Souaan was said to 
have become lonely after starting his studies away from the support 
networks provided by his family and girlfriend. While the engagement 
factors that played a part in his radicalisation were also likely driven 
by his personal connection to Syria, where members of his father’s 
family faced serious violence, Souaan’s isolation as a new student and 
subsequent involvement in protests organised by extremists linked to 
Anjem Choudary, a radical preacher imprisoned in 2016 for urging 
support of IS, highlight the impact the transition into an education 
environment can have.17
It is not just personal issues including loneliness and isolation which can 
make people particularly vulnerable to the engagement factors that 
may become part of a wider pathway into terrorism, though. Islamist 
extremists have often sought to target educational institutions over the 
years, and the increased exposure to external activists with a history 
of defending convicted terrorists, or claiming that the West is at war 
with Islam, may drive the development of these engagement factors. 
These can include the growth of ‘feelings of grievance and injustice’ 
and ‘feeling under threat’, as well as the development of intent factors 
such as a growth in ‘Them and Us thinking’, the ‘dehumanisation of 
the enemy’ and an ‘over-identification with a group or ideology’ that 
can lead people to develop the intent to cause harm.18
The presence of these factors was particularly apparent on campus 
at two events in 2015. In February, speakers were recorded telling 
students at Queen Mary University in London that Muslims are “feared 
and hated” in the West and face a situation akin to the Jews in Nazi 
Germany. One student at the event was arrested in Turkey just weeks 
later after it was feared he was trying to travel into Syria. A second event 
in November, which took place in London at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS), saw a number of speakers call for the release 
of terrorists convicted in open court, including Munir Farooqi, convicted 
of soliciting to murder, and Anis Sardar, convicted of murder. The event 
promotional material claimed that those imprisoned of terror offences 
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Souaan was said to have become lonely after starting his studies  
away from the support networks provided by his family and girlfriend. 
While the engagement factors that played a part in his radicalisation 
were also likely driven by his personal connection to Syria, where 
members of his father’s family faced serious violence.
were, in fact, victims of “fabricated accounts of terrorist acts produced 
through forced … confessions”.19 Prior to his arrest in 2014, Suhaib 
Majeed had also invited a speaker onto campus who had previously 
claimed a terrorist convicted of soliciting to murder and providing 
terrorism training had been “locked up unfairly under false terror 
charges” and encouraged people to campaign for his release.20
The specific targeting of education institutions by Islamist extremists 
and subsequent vulnerability this brings to the sector extends beyond 
events organised with speakers. In early 2014, men connected to the 
banned organisation, al-Muhajiroun, targeted at least two London 
universities under the name ‘Need4Khilafah’, later listed by the 
government as an alias for the proscribed group. They sought to 
engage students in discussion, providing a clear example of another 
way in which students, who may already have developed engagement 
and intent factors, can be exposed to radicalising influences.21
Later in in 2014, meanwhile, the discovery of an attempt by a small 
number of activists to gain access to the structures within schools in 
Birmingham and use these to impose “an intolerant and aggressive 
Islamic ethos” highlights activity that can potentially have the 
same effect. The British government’s counter-extremism strategy 
documented the findings of Peter Clarke’s report on this activity, 
and also highlighted findings by the Department for Education and 
schools regulator Ofsted that pupils at a number of schools in East 
London may have been “vulnerable to extremist influences and 
radicalisation” due to the intolerant teaching they were receiving.22
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Responding to the differing vulnerabilities demonstrated within the 
UK’s education sectors has required policy-makers to focus on these 
two main elements of the problem: on the one hand, ensuring that 
those students vulnerable to radicalisation can be identified and 
supported; on the other hand, making the sector more resilient to 
extremist misuse. While local contexts will differ across the EU, these 
two broad challenges are the ones which most member states will 
face, as they develop CVE initiatives, and the evolution of practice in 
the UK can potentially provide some lessons for the future.
A key development has been the formalisation of the safeguarding 
narrative around radicalisation issues and the subsequent 
collaborative provision of services to those assessed to be at risk. Since 
the initial pilot of the Channel programme in 2007, in which the police 
led partnerships “modelled on other successful multi-agency risk 
management processes such as child protection, domestic violence 
and the management of high risk offenders”,23 the UK’s approach 
towards CVE has increasingly drawn on this language. The revised 
2011 Prevent strategy made this clear, stating that “preventing 
someone from becoming a terrorist or from supporting terrorism is 
substantially comparable to safeguarding in other areas, including 
child abuse or domestic violence”.24
Following the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act in 
February 2015, this approach has become a statutory responsibility 
for schools and most higher education institutions, with the legislation 
giving institutions a duty to have “due regard to the need to prevent 
people from being drawn into terrorism”.25 Guidance released for 
schools in June 2015 highlights how the sector should operate, saying 
that “protecting children from the risk of radicalisation should be 
seen as part of schools’ … wider safeguarding duties, and is similar 
in nature to protecting children from other harms (e.g. drugs, gangs, 
neglect, sexual exploitation)”.26 As a result, a consistent framework 
for the provision of local authority support including mentoring, life 
skills guidance, cognitive behavioural therapies, and health/housing/
Responding to vulnerabilities and lessons to be learned
A key development has been the formalisation of the safeguarding 
narrative around radicalisation issues and the subsequent 
collaborative provision of services to those assessed to be at risk.
substance abuse support, is available to those assessed to be at 
risk,27 while a network of regional Prevent coordinators specialising in 
higher and further education provide institutions with advice outside 
of law enforcement structures, and away from the language of ‘pre-
criminal spaces’.
The focus on safeguarding also feeds into efforts to challenge 
extremist misuse of the education sector, making it difficult for groups 
to undermine counter-radicalisation efforts without positioning 
themselves in opposition to protective measures. In the UK, a well-
organised campaign to see CVE efforts scrapped has developed, 
driven by extremist groups and public sector and student unions. 
Spreading misleading information about delivery processes and 
inflammatory claims about individual cases, the campaign’s primary 
themes include accusations that state-driven racism and anti-Muslim 
bigotry are an inherent part of Prevent; that the programme drives 
a chilling of political activism within Muslim communities in order to 
silence dissent; that the Prevent duty forces sector staff to spy on 
individuals within their care; and that there is no proof Prevent works, 
nor any academic backing/research behind it.28
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In the UK, a well-organised campaign to see CVE efforts  
scrapped has developed, driven by extremist groups and public  
sector and student unions
With French activists already involved with this campaign, it is clear 
there is the potential for themes and tactics seen in the UK to appear 
in the EU,29 and challenging this campaign will be vital if Europe’s 
CVE efforts are to be a success. With this in mind, it will be important 
for member states developing programmes to ask if their procedures 
will:
1 - CHALLENGE MISINFORMATION
Any CVE programme should come equipped with a clear process 
by which misleading stories about delivery face swift and robust 
rebuttal from the relevant authorities. This could take the form 
of an engagement unit specifically designed to respond to 
media stories, with a clear line of communication to government 
departments most likely to see stories about alleged inappropriate 
delivery – something most common in the education sector in the 
UK. However, simply reacting to false claims will not be enough, and 
structures developed must also provide the necessary support for 
practitioners to effectively respond to myths about the strategy 
during engagement. Consultation events which give communities 
the opportunity to raise concerns with local delivery staff should go 
hand in hand with the creation of regularly updated material for 
staff rebutting the arguments used by opponents and addressing 
misunderstood aspects of the strategy.
2 - ADVERTISE SUCCESS
The extent to which un-evidenced claims Prevent has failed to 
stop people being radicalised are spread in the UK highlights 
the importance of complementing engagement plans with the 
promotion of cases where CVE intervention has been beneficial. 
While data protection must remain paramount, the development 
of an anonymised database of successful interventions could aid 
evaluation of differing practice and intervention provision, as well 
as being included in online training to give staff within sectors 
vulnerable to extremist misuse the chance to see the results of CVE 
delivery in context. Meanwhile, giving delivery staff the opportunity 
to recommend individuals keen for their case to be publicised may 
give local community groups the opportunity to engage with the 
programme beyond reporting or providing services.
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3 - PROVIDE ACCOUNTABILITY
Finally, recognition within programmes that mistakes can be 
made and that inappropriate action may be taken by delivery 
staff will be vital. Ensuring any CVE programme comes with an 
independent investigative complaint mechanism should therefore 
be a priority. This could take the form of a separate division within 
the relevant regulatory bodies for those sectors involved with the 
programme, or in the creation of an overarching independent 
regulatory body similar to the Office of the Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation in the UK. Ultimately, this should aim to 
hold the programme to account, as well as prevent concerns about 
delivery being taken to extremist campaign groups, rather than an 
accountable authority.
While developing counter-radicalisation efforts as part of wider 
safeguarding programmes and ensuring cross-sector consistency 
are a start, developing structures which address these issues will be 
more of a challenge, and require significant buy-in from local delivery 
staff. However, if EU member states are to effectively challenge 
radicalisation within their schools, colleges, and universities, putting 
such structures in place early to head off the opposition seen in the 
UK should be considered a key part of any strategy
Tahir Abbas, Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF ONLINE 
EXTREMIST NARRATIVES
In the current era, numerous issues arise from the radicalisation of 
vulnerable youths and the repercussions raised for securitisation, 
policing and intelligence. Of particular concern is the internet as a 
space in which various forms of radicalisation occur. However, while 
there is a role for the internet in radicalisation, the precise nature 
of the processes that inveigle young people and ‘activate’ their 
radicalisation requires greater understanding1. Nor is it possible to 
argue that the internet increases the rate or intensity of terrorism. 
Numerous studies demonstrate that the internet is merely a 
facilitator, not exclusively an enabler2. Furthermore, the offline world 
cannot be disregarded as an important element, despite the power 
of the internet to connect people and ideas.
Importantly, the situation of young people who might be susceptible to 
radicalisation emerges within a particular social, cultural and political 
context. The restructuring of the economic base, from manufacturing 
to services, has resulted in a ‘left behind’ generation of marginalised, 
disenfranchised, alienated young men (and women), both indigenous 
and a minority3. In Western Europe, the growth of far-right and Islamist 
extremism is directly associated with transformations to economy and 
society that have resulted in groups feeling unable to contribute to their 
individual existence, leading to alienation and anomie. In this context, 
anger and resentment is redirected against the ‘other’. For far-right 
groups, theirs is a ‘counter-Jihad’ narrative that instrumentalises 
the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism, anti-immigration and anti-religion, 
namely anti-Islam4. In addition to politicising groups, this far-right, 
online world is an alternative reality that serves individuals seeking 
knowledge but also provides information on how to make bombs, for 
example. Individuals can remain reclusive and undetected in an arena 
where aggressive gaming is also an issue, permitting people such 
as Anders Breivik to move from a hard core gamer to a terrorist, for 
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Introduction
Print and television media affects perceptions, but the role of the 
internet, and in particular social media, is vital to consider when 
understanding how media shapes opinion and behaviour. Social 
media is habitually anonymous, but can also be organised, i.e. 
‘astroturfing’, comments on online articles and on social media 
that give the impression of being from random members of the 
public when they are, in fact, part of highly organised and well-
funded campaigns. In the last decade or so, social media has grown 
immensely as an information and communication tool. The medium is 
used to provide regular updates on activities as well as commentaries 
on various topics and themes, some of which relate to sensitive areas. 
Radicalisers also instrumentalise the power of social media with slick 
media messaging, and a resource-intensive focus on ‘grooming’ 
vulnerable young people online. With the lack of any regulations, a 
relatively open platform and the ability to hide behind a nom de plume, 
social media allows different individuals and groups to support and 
participate in radicalised activities6.
Twitter is one of the easiest and most flexible social medial platforms 
to use. It has become a favourite among individuals and organisations 
using it to lure potential foreign fighters willing to join the Islamic 
State, for example. Based on various national and international 
infrastructures, the Islamic State is able to organise its online activities 
despite temporary setbacks to its operations. Back room staff put 
together tweets with YouTube videos and other documentation in an 
on-going process of communication, indoctrination and recruitment. 
Much of this online platform is managed behind the scenes, not just 
Multiple digital and social media roles
Twitter is one of the easiest and most flexible social medial platforms 
to use. It has become a favourite among individuals and organisations 
using it to lure potential foreign fighters willing to join the Islamic 
State, for example.
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example5. In the case of radical Islamists, their frustration is projected 
at a global level, where a sense of obligation to a self-transcendental 
cause is the defining characteristic. However, as anger surfaces in 
many young people, only very few move from the view that their group 
identity is under threat to actual instances of violent extremism.
as mere acts of random online messaging, but as highly regulated 
output. Certainly, if soldiers attempt to communicate with family and 
friends outside of controlled territories, they are likely to face severe 
punishment. ‘Twitter is used to propagandize for core Jihadist tenets 
that are translated into symbolic images for a generation of social 
media users who prefer pictures to text’7. This architecture of control 
is vital to understand.
Furthermore, although lone actor themes are important to consider 
in radicalisation, technically, when anyone supports the rhetoric of 
any particular online ideology that leads to violent extremism, they 
do so through ‘digital tribalism’. That is, group identities take on new 
meaning in the context of individuals connected through various 
nodes. The internet is crucial in helping to distil not merely the content 
of the message and the impact it has on perceptions, but also the 
processes behind the generation of those messages and what they 
mean for a digital presence. This affects Islamist groups but also far-
right groups, both of which experience a sense of identity loss through 
globalisation. The latter projects it locally and nationally in reclaiming 
lost territory and projecting anti-immigration sentiment, and the 
former cast it nationally and globally, with reference to resisting 
integration in the West, foreign policy and the idea of reclaiming an 
imagined ‘golden past’ ideologically hurled onto the present.
Western media tend to focus on beheading videos as ostensibly 
the main output of Islamic State media, with other areas of content 
frequently ignored8. This includes the utopian vision of the Caliphate, 
which appeals to Muslims based on an obedience to authoritarianism, 
and that it is a rightful duty incumbent upon Muslims to join it. The 
Inspire magazine, produced by Al Qaeda, and thought to be behind 
the radicalisation and the participation of Western and Islamic 
world Muslims in violent jihad, is an important case in point. Aiming 
to resonate with Western audiences, much of its focused content 
documents instances of terrorist violence in the name of Jihad, but 
the magazine also contains wider discussions on the idea of Jihad. 
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The complex and multi-layered structure of Islamic State social media 
output shows that the movement has its finger on the aspirations 
of otherwise alienated and disconnected Muslims in Europe, and in 
parts of the Muslim world facing similar concerns. The Islamic State 
is especially motivated to deliver a message accepted by certain 
conservative Muslims, but without always the need to emphasise 
violence or terrorism. Therefore, analysts and policy-makers working 
to eliminate the threat from such attempts to motivate young 
Muslims operate within a framework that contains a huge canvas of 
opinion. A significant part of it is outwardly extremist in nature, but 
not all of it emphasises violent extremism. Therefore, it is argued 
that “government resources would be better used in developing 
counter-narrative strategies based on “reverse-engineering” the 
core principles underpinning the strategic logic of IS’s [Islamic State’s] 
IO [information operations] campaign”10. Such strategies need to first 
dismantle the messages, work with messengers who can reach out 
to a diverse body of people, crucially bringing with them vulnerable 
people on the borderlines of radicalisation, and, finally, to actively work 
with media in order to promote the messengers and help to break 
down the negative messages11. A specific counter-narrative strategy is 
to adopt a ‘Jihadi cool’ narrative that seeks to nullify, but then to also 
provide a direct alternative to a popular form of aggressive masculinity 
promulgated by the nuances of the digital media in question12. This 
can take different forms depending on different opportunity frames.
Research on the experiences of Islamists radicalised online points to a 
number of underlying concerns. The following is a summary of the main 
Calling ‘Jihad’
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The substance of the magazine changes with various events and 
themes. For example, the Arab Spring created particular junctures 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, shifting the 
publication’s focus to regional and local matters. It suggests that how 
people read the magazine is not based on unambiguously accepting 
the call to radicalisation, but that an information-dissemination role 
is also enacted as well as consumed by their readers. Some of this 
may or may not ultimately lead to violent radicalisation9. Factors that 
affect whether an individual is turned to violent radicalisation are as 
much individual as they are specific to the circumstances in which 
these people find themselves.
perspectives employed by the Islamic State to recruit foreign fighters 
through the ‘digital superhighway’. Each is a specific mechanism 
through which young minds are enticed to join the cause:
❯  Humanitarian: at some basic level, the call to Jihad is motivated by 
a sense of duty with reference to the roles and responsibilities of 
active Muslims to help in humanitarian causes, particularly but 
not solely in Syria.
❯  Democracy: The Islamic State argues that an inherent, unbridgeable 
and permanent divide exists between Islam and democracy, where 
incompatibility is the norm. It extends this argument to understand 
that living in dar-al-kufar [the land of the unbelievers] is un-Islamic 
and that the only answer is aggressive jihad.
❯  Eschatology: The Islamic State promulgates the religious and 
political ideology that the ‘end of times’ is upon Muslims, and that 
it is a duty upon Muslims over the world to defend the Caliphate 
established for precisely this purpose.
❯  Identity: The Islamic State tries to propel a particular Muslim 
identity, where its true essence is better formed and shaped in 
the Caliphate. This call to Jihad is based upon a utopian vision of a 
perfect society, created for Muslims to flourish as the ideal Muslims.
Therefore, in relation to the media messaging power of radical 
Islamists, it is important to deconstruct the content of prominent online 
magazines Dabiq and Inspire. Both focus on the idea of Islam as under 
attack and in crisis. The response is armed jihad against apostate 
regimes in the MENA region. The message compels people to join 
the ‘vanguard of believers’, as part of their individual duty in Islam, 
with the overall goal of supporting the Caliphate. However, unlike the 
Islamic State, Al Qaida does not wish to become the sole leader of the 
global Islamic community, but simply a catalyst for change. In line with 
this aim, Inspire magazine focuses on attacks against Western targets 
through the ‘lone wolf’ individual at home. Currently, it also glorifies 
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the battles in Yemen and celebrates martyrs. It provides ‘open source 
jihad’, such as how ‘to make a bomb in your mother’s kitchen’13.
In contrast, the central strategy for Islamic State is the creation and 
maintenance of the Caliphate, emulating the perfect city (Medina) 
model and the importance of migration to it (hijra). This is somewhat 
different from Al Qaida, whose core ideas are binary but also virtual, 
unlike the Islamic State, which, through the fortunes of war between 
existing Al Qaida-affiliate groups, instrumentalised the idea of the 
founding of a state. In particular, Dabiq presents the formation of the 
Islamic State as a success story, a perfect place for Muslims, delivering 
a utopian vision of the ideal home for Muslims from across the world, 
portrayed as having efficient services, excellent living conditions, 
bountiful food and complete freedom. The aim is to attract new citizens 
to the state. All the while, it hails the cause as a triumphant victory, 
while demonising the enemy, including Shias as well as all ‘others’14.
In general, Islamic State takes a mixed approach to its social media 
strategy, and uses many different platforms. They range from the 
general message conveyed via popular platforms such as Twitter, 
finally moving to more one-to-one targeted approaches using such 
apps as Telegram and the online forum, Ask.fm. In this respect, 
Twitter is the gateway entry point; however, in recent periods, it has 
faced pressure from governments to take down problematic content, 
which has created challenges for Twitter and other major social media 
outlets. It calls into question how government policy is able to affect 
independent private companies whose modus operandi is based on 
interaction with the wider public.
The Islamic State drafts social media content and disseminates it 
widely to the public, for example, when a terrorist attack happens. 
The group promotes videos of the act for shock value, then lionises the 
attacker, pushes the message of fame to attract more people to do 
the same, ultimately using the attacks for later propaganda purposes 
in a bid to arouse others. This media output is of professional 
production quality: no more grainy VHS recordings carried out in 
caves. The Islamic State also produces videos re-enacting popular 
content such as scenes from the Hunger Games or Saw films. It is an 
attempt to engage target audiences through media messages, 
using references that are already familiar among consumers of 
contemporary Hollywood-quality production techniques. It is also a 
skilful use of psychological processes.
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A large body of analytical thinking, as well as evidence obtained from 
young people and research carried out by various credible institutions 
of government, academia and independent think tanks, continues to 
argue that the reasons why so many European-born Muslim youth are 
drawn to radicalisation in far off lands is because their own countries 
have not done enough to integrate them. However, such thinking 
excludes the role of catalysts or accelerators, but while the role of the 
internet has been established, how people are radicalised through it 
remains unclear15. Moreover, existing research does not fully address 
the systematic causation between the availability of Islamist digital 
and social media and people’s uptake of it. As of yet, there has been no 
methodical way of measuring this influence either. In addition, while the 
existence of online radicalisation is undeniable, how it links to offline 
radicalisation remains unidentified. Furthermore, the notion of the ‘lone 
actor’ is a misnomer; inevitably, others are involved. The ‘lone actor’ is 
not a single detached actor but, arguably, an individual who is part of a 
wider network of similarly minded individuals – the ‘digital tribe’16.
There is also the issue of the offending material taken down from 
one platform and then reposted elsewhere, unless there is greater 
cooperation between private social media companies. Therefore, 
it is important to have a tacit understanding between social media 
companies, as well as taking the same approach to hate speech, 
making it easier for the public to report all of these incidents. Countering 
violent extremism policy is wedded to the idea of generating ‘positive 
alternative narratives’ to help challenge and undermine the terrorist 
narratives. For example, for people trying to go to Syria to help innocent 
Syrians, governments could put out the message of alternative ways 
to help Syrians through bona fide charities. Arguably, civil society 
organisations are better placed to produce the narrative, but they 
do not have the resources to generate content on such a wide scale. 
Prioritising research and policy agendas
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Small local approaches can be effective, with enough distance from 
governments to be credible. Nevertheless, it is necessary not to target 
Muslims disproportionately, as it fuels existing Islamophobia, making 
the original problem potentially worse. Islamophobia is part of a grand 
narrative that has many implications for Muslim communities, including 
legitimising far right sentiments.
The dominant strategy tends to be two-fold – counter-narrative and 
removal. However, the efficacy of both strategies is unclear. There 
is no real way of knowing whether they are working or not. Moreover, 
there are implications going forward as the CVE (Countering Violent 
Extremism) paradigm receives a significant injection of financial 
resources and political will from many governments in the West. In 
addition, the psychological dimension is an important area, namely the 
processes of online recruitment, from Orlando and Nice to Baghdad. 
No longer is there any need for jihadists to travel. This poses additional 
challenges for policy-makers. How is it possible to measure the success 
of government-led initiatives to combat extremist narratives online? 
Have any actually been measured? Do marginalised young people 
with existing grievances trust anything they think comes from the 
government? The chances are that they are more likely to rebel against 
it. What are the ethical implications of redirecting the public in this way? 
Does it help or hinder future efforts in online CVE content creation? In 
an ideal world, a solution would be to use content campaigns created 
and driven by genuine grassroots organisations, based on local success 
stories, that inspire constructive and useful debate around sensitive 
issues. The approach would have to be tailored for different cultural 
contexts, as a one-size fits all approach is unlikely to be effective.
The internet is an ‘echo chamber’ for Islamist thinking, but the internet 
did not create radical Islamism. Nor does it mean that this thinking 
will necessarily lead to violent outcomes17. It is an important matter 
as repercussions result from policing this ‘echo chamber’ as a space 
from which to spread messages of hate and to target groups18. 
Therefore, the concern must be to remove the messages but also the 
messengers, but with the need to remain mindful of the implications 
of over-generalisation in relation to certain community characteristics, 
as well as the legitimate basis for resistance to policies deemed 
inappropriate by various groups
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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) measures in Europe: 
RESULTS AND CHALLENGES
Over the last few years, largely motivated by the dramatic growth 
of the phenomenon of European foreign fighters traveling to Syria 
and the related wave of attacks seen throughout the continent, 
many European countries have introduced Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) measures.1 This decision comes from a widespread 
understanding that traditional law enforcement tactics alone cannot 
solve the problem but need to be supplemented by measures aimed 
at preventing radicalisation and at de-radicalising individuals who 
have already undergone the radicalisation process.
While using different approaches and tactics, in substance all CVE 
programmes seek to target the appeal extremist ideologies exert on 
young people. Most European strategies are not limited exclusively to 
the issue of radical Islamist-inspired violence. Yet, in reality, the vast 
majority of initiatives and resources (arguably a disproportionate 
percentage) are devoted to stemming Islamist extremism. Some 
countries have experimented with CVE for more than a decade. 
The pioneer in the field is the United Kingdom, which, in 2003, 
launched an initiative called “Prevent” to implement a comprehensive 
domestic CVE strategy. Despite its many revisions and widespread 
criticism, Prevent remains a model from which the European Union 
and most European governments draw inspiration.2 Countries like 
the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway also have a relatively long 
experience with CVE. Other countries, such as Spain and France, are 
relative newcomers to it. In some others, there is no or only a nascent 
debate on the subject.
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Introduction
The pioneer in the field is the United Kingdom, which, in 2003, 
launched an initiative called “Prevent” to implement a comprehensive 
domestic CVE strategy. Despite its many revisions and widespread 
criticism, Prevent remains a model from which the European Union  
and most European governments draw inspiration.2
European CVE programmes differ greatly from one another in 
terms of aims, structure, budget, and underlying philosophy, and 
each individual programme is deeply shaped by the host country’s 
unique political, cultural, and legal elements. Nevertheless, certain 
key characteristics and challenges are common to all European CVE 
programmes. It can be argued that, in Europe as elsewhere, CVE is 
somewhat of a catch-all term that encompasses three large macro-
families of activities that include:
❯  General preventive measures: These initiatives aim to challenge 
extremist ideas and influences in society; promote tolerant, 
moderate and democratic principles; and address factors that can 
increase vulnerability to radicalisation. Some focus on economic 
integration, seeking to facilitate access to employment and 
education for disadvantaged groups. Others use mentors and role 
models to positively influence youths. Various programmes seek to 
promote self-awareness and critical thinking in young people. Few 
programmes have an overtly religious focus. An example is the 
“Radical Middle Way”, a British Foreign Office-sponsored project 
that connects Muslim scholars with predominantly British Muslim 
youth. While youths are the main targets of these initiatives, others 
seek to engage parents and women in particular. Included in this 
category are also counter-messaging/counter-narrative initiatives 
such as the work of the UK Home Office’s Research, Information 
and Communications Unit (RICU) or the recently established 
French Government’s website Stop Jihadism (http://www.stop-
djihadisme.gouv.fr/). The effectiveness of these measures is often 
quite difficult to assess.
❯  Outreach/engagement measures: These initiatives aim to 
improve communication and build trust between authorities 
and communities. Some target prominent community leaders, 
while others proactively seek to cast a wider net, even seeking 
to establish a dialogue with potentially hostile audiences. Danish 
officials, for example, have long visited schools with many 
Muslim students to explain and dispel misconceptions about 
Danish society and foreign policy.3 In some cases, authorities 
hope that establishing a trust-based relationship can also lead 
to increased intelligence originating from communities, though 
this is often considered a secondary and incidental by-product.
Key features
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❯  Individual interventions: Rather than targeting large population 
cross-sections, these initiatives aim to “rehabilitate” people 
who appear to be radicalising to violence. Countries that adopt 
such an approach invest resources in training a wide range of 
government employees and partners to recognise the common 
causes, risks, and manifestations of radicalisation. Officials 
receiving training include police officers, educators, university 
administrators, health professionals, social workers, housing 
officers, prison guards, and probation officers. These individuals 
are then expected to detect potential cases of radicalisation 
among individuals with whom they are in contact through their 
professional lives and refer them to authorities.
The body to which referrals are made varies from country to country. 
Under Great Britain’s targeted intervention scheme, known as the 
“Channel Programme”, referrals go to coordinators appointed for 
each local government district. These coordinators usually have 
a police background (though increasingly less so). In various Dutch 
and Danish municipalities, on the other hand, law enforcement 
agencies are not directly involved in the process, as the units who run 
interventions are composed of civil servants, psychologists and, in 
some cases, former extremists.
Once the at-risk person has been identified and referred, the 
evaluating body assesses the severity of the risk. If authorities assess a 
genuine threat, they craft targeted interventions aimed at swaying the 
individual away from militancy and back to a normal life. In most cases 
the intervention entails the designation of a mentor, somebody who 
already has or could potentially establish a trust-based relationship 
with the radicalising individual. This process, which is constantly 
monitored by authorities, is complex and varies from case to case. 
Ideally, the mentor steers the radicalising individual away from violent 
extremism.
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Over the last few years, European authorities have displayed 
diminished enthusiasm for large, preventive programmes due to 
their high costs and difficulty in empirically determining effectiveness. 
Individual interventions are, on the other hand, increasingly popular 
because, conversely, they are cost-effective and easier to evaluate. 
For security and privacy reasons authorities are reluctant to provide 
hard data on intervention success rates. Nonetheless, officials 
throughout Europe consider targeted interventions an extremely 
useful complement to traditional counter-terrorism tactics. While 
it is clear that interventions will not work in all cases, their threat-
reduction effect is a much needed relief for Europe’s overwhelmed 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Over the last few months, targeted interventions have also been 
increasingly used in cases of aspiring and returning foreign fighters. 
Indeed, authorities in Europe face difficulties in obtaining evidence to 
prosecute those who seek to reach or return from Syria/Iraq or other 
battlefields, and monitoring the bulging numbers of aspiring militants 
and returnees. Thus, officials have increasingly resorted to one-by-one 
interventions as a last resort tool in their effort to tackle the challenge.
In this regard, the approaches used by the German “Hayat” 
programme4 and the Danish city of Aarhus5 have attracted particular 
attention. Hayat is a nation-wide family counselling programme run 
by a non-governmental organisation with financial backing of the 
German government. The programme offers highly personalised and 
targeted interventions aimed “to counsel and work with the relatives 
of radicalised persons to eventually prevent, decelerate and invert 
the radicalisation process.” Similar initiatives, many of them linked to 
telephone hotlines, have been created both by civil society organisations 
and government entities throughout Germany, with the goal of assisting 
individuals undergoing, or who have undergone the radicalisation 
process, along with their families.
Similarly prominent is the project implemented in Aarhus by the local 
municipality, in collaboration with the police, the Danish Security and 
Intelligence Service (PET), and various governmental entities. The 
program was created in 2013, after the city of Aarhus saw a very large 
number of residents (some 30) travel to Syria to fight. The programme 
Over the last few years, European authorities have displayed 
diminished enthusiasm for large, preventive programmes due to their 
high costs and difficulty in empirically determining effectiveness.
European authorities conceiving and implementing CVE initiatives 
are faced with several problems. Among them:
❯  The complexity of the radicalisation process: Unfortunately 
for policymakers and practitioners, radicalisation is a highly 
individualised process.6 Efforts to simplify radicalisation into a 
linear, step-by-step process fail to recognise the complexity of the 
issue. As such, attempts to disengage from violence, or even de-
radicalise, an individual must be tailored to that unique situation. 
Officials and community members must be flexible in their 
approaches, making it difficult to develop nation-wide, general 
programmes which, in turn, increases the difficulties of developing 
useful national programmes and sharing best practices.
❯  Finding partners: Over time, European authorities have 
understood that, in order to obtain the crucial support of various 
stakeholders, they need to explain their strategy and aim to the 
public, the categories of professionals with whom they seek to 
work, and, in particular, the communities they aim to reach. Many 
potential partners, in fact, tend to be sceptical of the government’s 
actions and refuse to cooperate or, in some cases, they actively 
undermine counter-radicalisation initiatives.
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The challenges
uses a variety of tools (mostly interventions by psychologists and 
religious leaders) to sway young people on the path to radicalisation 
and to rehabilitate returning foreign fighters. While it is arguably too 
early to make a definitive assessment, there are strong indications 
that the programme is quite successful, as the flow of foreign fighters 
from Aarhus has significantly slowed down.
This problem was particularly acute in the UK, where a variety of 
stakeholders initially condemned CVE initiatives and, in particular, its 
intervention scheme (Channel) as tools to criminalise young people 
for their views. Outlining the case of Hasib Hussain, one of the London 
suicide/homicide-bombing perpetrators in July 2005, Sir Norman 
Bettison of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), explained 
why interventions with radicalised individuals are conceived ‘‘precisely 
to avoid them criminalising themselves”:
Increasingly aware of the need to be more inclusive, European 
authorities have begun to describe their efforts using the language 
of protection or, as the British say, “safeguarding.” Young people 
like teenage student Hasib Hussain undergoing a process of 
radicalisation are seen as vulnerable individuals harming themselves 
and, ultimately, in need of help. Radicalisation in this articulation is 
presented as a problem like gang recruitment, drugs, or paedophilia. 
Just as they would do if they detected young people falling prey to 
these social ills, community leaders and teachers have a duty to report 
cases of radicalisation. This framing has become even more common 
over the last few months, as more and more cases of radicalisation 
involve individuals in their teens or even pre-teens. Authorities have 
likened these instances of radicalisation to cases of child abuse, with 
online recruiters likened to internet paedophiles.8
❯  Effectively training partners: It is not simple to set up a diffuse 
network of individuals with appropriate competences in effective 
intervention. A few hours of training cannot easily make teachers 
or street cops attuned to the intricate dynamics of radicalisation. 
Because knowledge is a crucial element of an effective counter-
radicalisation initiative, clumsy actions caused by partners with 
limited competences can produce negative repercussions.
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“We started to unpick what was known about Hasib Hussain. He had never come to the notice 
of the police at any stage in his young life and therefore, in terms of opportunities for the police 
to intervene to prevent what went on to occur, there were just no hooks there. However, what 
we did discover is that as a model student whilst at Matthew Murray School his exercise books 
were littered with references to Al-Qaeda, and the comments could not have been taken as 
other than supportive comments about Al-Qaeda. To write in one’s exercise book is not criminal 
and would not come on the radar of the police, but the whole ethos, the heart of Prevent is the 
question for me of whether someone in society might have thought it appropriate to intervene. 
What do I mean by intervention? I do not mean kicking his door down at 6 o’clock in the 
morning and hauling him before the magistrates. I mean should someone have challenged 
that? They are the sorts of cases that get referred through the Channel scheme.”7
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❯  Complex dynamics in Muslim communities: Counter-radicalisation 
efforts cannot succeed without the help of Muslim communities. 
Yet, Western Muslim communities are not monolithic. Authorities 
often struggle to identify whom to partner with from among a 
myriad of organisations, many of which compete against one 
another for political positioning. While dynamics change from 
country to country, choosing many local partners with roots in 
specific communities - rather than relying on one or two large 
national organisations - is a more effective way to engage. 
Creating partnerships with multiple organisations is more likely to 
harness the full potential of Muslim communities, without relying 
on a few self-appointed gatekeepers.
At the same time, issues of credibility and legitimacy are paramount. 
Which voices are listened to in the community, and can deliver a 
credible message? In this regard, a particularly controversial matter 
in Europe is the role of individuals and organisations linked to various 
strands of Salafism or to the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideological family. 
Should these “non-violent Islamists” be partners of the government 
against radicalisation? Are they part of the problem or part of the 
solution? Opinions on this matter are divided.9
❯  Measuring effectiveness: Providing clear metrics that empirically 
evaluate a CVE programme’s effectiveness is difficult. The 
challenge is particularly acute for preventive programmes, as it 
entails proving a negative: the number of individuals who did 
not radicalise because of the programme. De-radicalisation 
measures are, themselves, difficult to assess because 
determining when an individual has become “rehabilitated” is 
rarely a clear-cut call. Moreover, even empirical results can be 
interpreted in different ways. Does a 50% positive rate in a de-
radicalisation programme make it successful? Critics might 
well argue it does not, and journalists will most likely focus on 
those subjects who, despite interventions, went on to become 
terrorists. Yet, law enforcement agencies might disagree, arguing 
that halving their workload is a remarkable achievement.
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The wave of radicalisation that most European countries have 
experienced over the last five years is unprecedented and unlikely 
to significantly diminish in the near future. Improvements in the 
traditional counter-terrorism arena (e.g. better intelligence-
sharing, improved legislation, more manpower…) are sorely needed 
throughout the continent.
But it is the opinion of the vast majority of policy-makers and, even 
more tellingly, most law enforcement and intelligence officials, that 
CVE measures are necessary components in a comprehensive 
counter-terrorism strategy. They hardly constitute the silver bullet, 
and a lot of experience and research are needed to improve their 
effectiveness and better assess their results. But it is clear to most 
observers that they are vital tools.
The European Union has taken a proactive approach in this field. Even 
though CVE activities tend to fall within the jurisdiction of individual 
countries, the European Commission and, to a lesser degree, other 
European institutions, have sought to play a role in this space by 
funding CVE initiatives in individual countries and enhancing the 
exchange of best practices among member states. The creation of 
the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is, in this regard, a 
major step. RAN, in fact, seeks to be a clearing house for CVE-related 
matters and activities, bringing together officials and practitioners 
from throughout the continent to share their experiences. In its latest 
incarnation it also provides financial support to specific CVE initiatives 
in member states.
The necessity of boosting the CVE approach as a supplement to 
traditional counter-terrorism is made even more urgent by recent 
and likely forthcoming geopolitical events. The Islamic State’s loss of 
large sections and, possibly, all of its territory has resulted (and will 
likely result even more in the future) in the return of many European 
foreign fighters to their countries of origin. While some will be 
arrested, authorities will likely lack the evidence to charge many of 
them. While monitoring remains the logic and main response to this 
dynamic, programmes seeking to rehabilitate them appear to be also 
crucially important
The way forward
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The various contributions to this publication have underlined the multi-
dimensional and highly complex nature of jihadist radicalisation, both 
across and outside of Europe. It has also drawn attention to the need 
for comprehensive, multi-stakeholder, long-term policy responses by 
governments and societies alike, in the EU and beyond.
Based on the analyses in this book, as well as the project’s event 
discussions, several conclusions and recommendations for the EU 
and its member states could be drawn.
1 -  COUNTERING THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF JIHADIST 
RADICALISATION BY BETTER MOBILISING EXPERT 
KNOWLEDGE, FUNDAMENTAL DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES 
AND CIVIL SOCIETY PLAYERS ACROSS EUROPE
Despite the lack of a commonly agreed definition of radicalisation 
and violent extremism, radical Islamist ideologies arguably 
remain a powerful driver of such phenomena. These ideologies 
skilfully exploit a wide range of perceived or real socio-economic, 
cultural and foreign policy grievances at a collective or individual 
level, via sophisticated narratives of ‘victimisation’ of Muslims 
in Europe and beyond. As such, the ideological component of 
jihadist radicalisation needs to be promptly countered by better 
mobilising expert knowledge, the promotion of liberal democratic 
principles, and the empowerment of critical societal actors across 
the EU. Moreover, a more sustainable interaction to foster trust 
and understanding between Muslim communities and authorities 
is crucial. In particular:
❯  Policymakers at member state and EU level should make better 
use of the important contributions on the founding elements and 
basic working mechanisms of jihadist ideology and propaganda 
when developing future counter-radicalisation policies. To this end 
closer cooperation between member states, the EU institutions 
and researchers during the programming phase could help 
make research even more relevant and practical for European 
policymakers.
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❯  Democracy – and the critical thinking it entails – provides the best 
antidote for open societies to stand against the destructive ideology 
of jihadism and terrorism, as well as vis-à-vis the vicious cycle of 
‘cumulative extremism’ and ‘backlash politics’ coming from right-
wing and anti-Islam counter-reactions in several European countries. 
Democratic principles such as human rights, freedom of speech and 
the rule of law should always be guaranteed and, whenever needed, 
legally enforced across Europe. This will help empower citizens to 
challenge the jihadist discourse in the public sphere, from schools and 
universities to the internet. As an essentially democratic and pluralistic 
project, the EU has a special role to play in reinforcing the resilience 
of European societies and communities to prevent and challenge 
extremism in all its forms. To strengthen the resilience of particularly 
vulnerable communities, credible pro-European voices from those 
communities should be empowered and included by the EU and its 
member states in policy analysis and stakeholder dialogues.
❯  The key role of civil society actors, including grass-root organisations 
providing targeted assistance and support to vulnerable individuals 
or groups in Muslim communities across Europe, represents a key 
asset to be aptly acknowledged and leveraged by member states 
and EU institutions alike. Empowering civil society actors would 
also compensate for the inevitable downsides of the top-down 
approach dominating several counter-radicalisation programmes 
in Europe. The EPC-EFD-CEP project has sought to bring those 
voices closer to EU policymaking, and aimed to create stronger 
synergies between these two worlds, in order to better tackle the 
jihadist radicalisation phenomenon.
❯  There is also a need for local and national authorities to take further 
steps to engage with local Muslim communities in order to gain 
their trust and make them partners in the fight against jihadist 
radicalisation. Depending on national and local circumstances, local 
authorities such as social services, elected officials and the police 
should work closely with Muslim communities, to identify areas of 
mutually beneficial cooperation.
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2 -  COUNTERING EXTREMIST PROPAGANDA AND PROMOTING 
POSITIVE ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVES
Jihadists’ skilful use of online platforms and tools such as 
Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram and other social 
media, poses a multi-dimensional challenge to policymakers and 
the wider expert community in countering and preventing the 
indoctrination of vulnerable individuals. In particular, Muslim youths 
from communities across Europe at risk of being converted to the 
ideology and turned into extremists are being targeted. To counter 
extremist propaganda and effectively promote positive alternatives 
on a large scale, civil society should be allowed to take the lead. 
Empowering small non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or 
even engaged individuals by creating networks of pro-democratic 
activists will be key. Governments need to help create, support and 
maintain these networks, but should avoid taking the lead in these 
kinds of initiatives. Individuals who are curious about extremist 
content are unlikely to listen to government-led messages. Even 
more importantly, the credibility of civil society is at risk if it is viewed 
as being the state's mouthpiece.
Such a comprehensive effort should, among others, include the 
following elements:
❯  Disrupting propaganda: Responsive measures must be established 
to promptly flag up, refer and have removed online jihadist 
propaganda. Responsible and participatory partnerships between 
public authorities, social media providers, hi-tech companies and 
the online user community should be promoted, with the aim of 
building a ‘coalition of the willing’ against online radicalisation. This 
could be done, among others, by further developing the recently-
initiated EU Internet Forum and strengthening Europol’s Internet 
Referral Unit.
❯  Countering extremist narratives: Highlighting flaws, lies and 
contradictions within extremist propaganda can make those 
vulnerable to extremist propaganda re-think their views. 
Narrative campaigns also need to be accompanied by additional 
efforts to connect with the target audience over an extended 
period of time. One-to-one digital interventions, a form of online 
social work, is a necessary follow-up to satisfy the individual's 
need for attention and (inter-)action, and to evaluate whether 
the campaign and intervention did have the desired impact.
❯  Offering alternative narratives: Identifying and supporting 
credible messengers/role models, ranging from former foreign 
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fighters to imams, to youth leaders and sports heroes, is key in 
promoting positive alternative messages and actions into a 
language being spoken and understood by targeted audiences, 
whether online or in real-life situations. A strong focus should be 
placed on the younger generation of vulnerable individuals in 
schools and higher education institutions, including via EU-wide 
tools such as the Erasmus+ programme, as recently proposed 
by the European Commission.
3 -  MAXIMISING INTRA-EU COOPERATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND 
RADICALISATION, VIA GREATER INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION-
SHARING, MORE REGULAR EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICE AND 
LESSONS LEARNT AMONG POLICYMAKERS, AND FURTHER SUPPORT TO 
DEVELOPING TRANSNATIONAL DEBATES WITH THE WIDER PUBLIC
The increasingly transnational nature of jihadist radicalisation in 
Europe underlines the need for stronger collaboration between 
and among EU member states on a variety of related policy areas, 
from counter-terrorism coordination to a more participatory 
debate among policymakers, practitioners, experts and the wider 
public. These could include:
❯  Greater intelligence-sharing among European security 
apparatuses, as well as broader, multi-agency information-
sharing both domestically and intra-EU, with the aim of 
maximising the availability of data, information and awareness 
of on-going radicalisation campaigns and their potential to spur 
armed violence across Europe. While bilateral cooperation is 
likely to prevail in this domain, EU institutions and bodies, including 
the European Commission, Europol and the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), can play a supporting/facilitating role in 
making coordination a much more spontaneous reflex among 
European capitals.
❯  Increased and more regular exchanges of good practices and 
lessons learnt should be promoted among policymakers and 
practitioners. A special focus should be placed on the crucial 
tasks of prevention and de-radicalisation. Particular attention 
should also be given to preventing radicalisation in prisons, 
which remains a significant challenge across Europe and 
beyond, as well as on other shared challenges including criteria 
and benchmarks to identify and assess radicalisation processes, 
training for operators, and identification of suitable partners 
within and outside affected Muslim communities. For instance, 
the role of the EU-created Radicalisation Awareness Network 
(RAN) could be further strengthened with the aim of better 
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connecting relevant players across Europe, sharing knowledge 
and assessing national experiences.
❯  Beyond a purely institutional/official dimension, transnational, 
pluralistic and open debates on the challenges posed by 
radicalisation, and the need for innovative and effective 
responses should be supported by the EU and its member 
states. The goal should be to better engage and connect the 
policy community with the wider public – not least, in order to 
dismiss many dangerous myths about the extent and implications 
of jihadist radicalisation. The EPC-EFD project represents an 
attempt to demonstrate the added value of promoting debates 
on such crucial topics, beyond the usual suspects.
4 -  FURTHER STREAMLINING COUNTER-RADICALISATION EFFORTS IN 
THE EU’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY, THROUGH FURTHER EU 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST ISIS/DAESH, 
THEMATIC DIALOGUES WITH AFFECTED THIRD COUNTRIES, AND MORE 
EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM
The 2016 Brussels attacks, along with the others which shook 
up Europe and other regions over the past two years, clearly 
demonstrate the globalisation of jihadist radicalisation, and the 
blurring between the internal and external dimensions of European 
counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation policies. As such, 
counter-radicalisation efforts should be further streamlined in 
the EU’s foreign and security policy in the following areas, among 
others:
❯  Although purely military solutions cannot destroy the 
radicalisation challenge, it remains crucial for the EU and its 
member states to contribute to the defeat of ISIS/Daesh in Syria 
and Iraq. The very existence of the so-called Caliphate provides 
an often over-looked source of empowerment and propaganda 
for the jihadist discourse and its terrorist aims. In that light, the 
EU should strengthen its non-military partnership with the 
Global Coalition against Daesh, notably in the form of long-term 
stabilisation, humanitarian assistance and counter-messaging. 
In parallel, the EU should prepare for the likely blow-back that 
the forced dissolution of ISIS/Daesh in Syria and Iraq could 
generate. This could take the form of further terrorist attacks in 
Europe and elsewhere, and the intensification of radicalisation 
campaigns directed towards vulnerable individuals, including 
Muslim refugees seeking shelter in the EU.
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❯  More regular and deeper thematic dialogues on the prevention 
of radicalisation and de-radicalisation should be carried out 
by the EU with affected third countries, with the full support of 
member states, reaching out to local governments and societies 
with the aim of maximising information-sharing, discussing 
best practices and formulating possible solutions based on 
locally-specific needs and circumstances. Geographic priorities 
should include the Western Balkans, Turkey, Northern Africa, the 
Middle East and the Gulf, whose home-grown radicalisation 
phenomena and their external projections are all susceptible 
to affect, to varying degrees of intensity, Europe’s security 
interests. In that light, the recent focus put on counter-terrorism 
and counter-radicalisation policies by the EU Global Strategy on 
Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016, has the potential to 
bring about a stronger role for the EU in this key policy area.
❯  Likewise, stronger working relations on counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation should be cemented between the EU and 
other international organisations, including the UN, NATO, the 
Council of Europe the Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), the Organi sation for the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and 
the African Union (AU). This should help maximise the expected 
– but still unfulfilled – added value of effective multilateralism in 
addressing the global challenge of jihadist radicalisation.
Jihadist radicalisation provides just one of the many and serious 
crises affecting Europe nowadays, spanning from the economy all 
the way to migration and the rise of populism. Yet, as an insidious 
challenge cutting across ideological, socio-economic, technological 
and geopolitical domains, it represents a litmus test for the ultimate 
political resilience of the EU and its member states. It is also a test 
for the EU’s ability to guarantee, citizens’ security, the fundamental 
principles governing their democracies, and the essential cohesion 
of their evolving societies. As such, effectively tackling jihadist 
radicalisation should become a defining mission for Europe in the 
foreseeable future.
The European Policy Centre and the European Foundation for 
Democracy will continue to engage on these crucial themes in 2017, 
aiming to further contribute to the development of informed decisions 
and targeted policies by EU institutions and member states in the 
field of the prevention and countering of jihadist radicalisation
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